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A STUDY OF COMMUNITY FACTORS RELATED TO THE TURNOVER OF SUPERINTENDENTS--COMMUNITY POWER, SCHOOL BOARD STRUCTURE, AND THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR.

BY- MCCARTY, DONALD J. RAMSEY, CHARLES E.
CORNELL UNIV., ITHACA, N.Y.

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A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR STUDYING THE OPERATION OF SOCIAL POWER IN SCHOOL SYSTEMS WAS DEVELOPED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT A SCHOOL SYSTEM MUST BE UNDERSTOOD IN TERMS OF ITS SUPPORTING ENVIRONMENT. TWELVE DIRECTIONAL HYPOTHESES WERE TESTED TO DETERMINE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FOUR TYPES OF COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURES (DOMINATED, FACTIONAL, PLURALISTIC, AND INERT), FOUR KINDS OF SCHOOL BOARDS (DOMINATED, FACTIONAL, STATUS CONGRUENT, AND SANCTIONING), AND FOUR KINDS OF SUPERINTENDENT'S ROLES (FUNCTIONARY, POLITICAL STRATEGIST, PROFESSIONAL ADVISOR, AND DECISIONMAKER). FINDINGS GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE STUDY'S MAJOR THESES OF A POSITIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN SIMILAR TYPES OF COMMUNITIES AND SCHOOL BOARDS AND A DIVERSE SET OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN KINDS OF SUPERINTENDENT'S ROLES, WHEN CORRELATED WITH TYPES OF COMMUNITIES AND SCHOOL BOARDS. DATA FOR CHI SQUARE ANALYSIS WERE OBTAINED BY MEANS OF FOCUSED INTERVIEWS AND TAPE RECORDED RESEARCH CONDUCTED IN 51 COMMUNITIES IN THE NORTHEAST AND MIDWEST REPRESENTING 11 LARGE URBAN COMMUNITIES (ABOVE 25,000 POPULATION), 14 SMALL URBAN (2500-24,999), 10 SUBURBAN, AND 16 RURAL (UNDER 2500). TWO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS WERE FORMULATED FROM THE STUDY TO REDUCE THE SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT'S VULNERABILITY TO SHORT TERM DEMANDS--(1) THE SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT SHOULD BE GIVEN AT LEAST A THREE-YEAR CONTRACT RENEWABLE ANNUALLY, AND (2) STATE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION SHOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF SCHOOLS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. (JK)

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May 1967

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A STUDY OF COMMUNITY FACTORS RELATED TO THE TURNOVER OF SUPERINTENDENTS: COMMUNITY POWER, SCHOOL BOARD STRUCTURE, AND THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATOR

Project No. 2891

Contract No. OE-5-0325-2-12-1

Donald J. McCarty
Charles E. Ramsey

May 1967

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Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 14850

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. The Research Problem

This research was undertaken as an initial test of a model designed to study in a comparative framework the operation of social power in the school system. The model includes three elements. The first element is the nature of community power itself, which is divided into four types of power structures. The second element is divided into four types of structures of power as it operates in the decision-making process in the school board. The types of decision-making process and power in the school board is posited by the model to correspond to the respective types of structures of power in the community. The third element is the role that the superintendent of schools is logically expected to play, and again is divided into four appropriate roles which are deemed to correspond to the four types of power in the community and the four types of structure in the school board. The substantive problem of the present research, then, is to determine the correspondence among the four types of power in the community, the four types of structures in the school board, and the four roles of superintendent.

The study of power is a relatively recent interest in sociology and education. While there have been some excellent case studies, the theory of power is still at a controversial stage in the literature. These case studies often reach markedly different conclusions and these disagreements have been mainly attributed to methodology. However, the model being tested in this study was designed to attribute the differences in findings to substantive rather than methodological considerations. Data were taken in interviews with persons from 51 different communities. This gives a comparative structure to the present study which is unusual in research of this complexity. The superintendent in each of these 51 communities was interviewed, as were all of his school board members. In each of the research sites from six to twenty formal and informal community influentials were also subjected to intensive interviews.

Since it was necessary to use one method in selecting leaders, and one method in analyzing the data, the methodological issue is not entirely solved in this study. Inasmuch as the methodological issue remains, there is an extensive discussion of some of the problems involved in the methods of studying power in this report. Mainly, the difficulty of methodology in the study of power rests upon four factors:

a. The community is a cumbersome unit of analysis, and in using many individuals as sources of data we find some disagreements in the perceptions of events;

b. the data on power are sensitive data, and special skill is required in probing and taking advantage of leads, thus making difficult the use of structured instruments which lend themselves readily to quantification;

c. the manifestations of power are extremely varied, and, therefore, we do not know what precise questions to ask on a structured instrument at this stage in the development of the theory of power.

d. Power structures may be developmental and transitory, and, therefore, analysis at a static point in time diminishes chances of grasping some of the more dynamic aspects of the system.

It is our contention that crude studies which give us less precision but a more valid picture of the events in which power is exercised will be needed in the development of more sophisticated methodology. Therefore, we have used some of the experiences and findings of this study to suggest at certain points how this methodology should develop.

Therefore, there are really two research problems in the present study. The first is the substantive test of the model which will explain differences in previous findings on substantive rather than methodological grounds. The second is the use of data and experiences to suggest guidelines for some of the methodological issues in the study of power.

B. The Background of the Problem

We usually think of studying the structure of an organization by evaluating its effect on the functions of that organization. The approach in such a case would be to vary power, structure of the school board, and the roles of the chief school administrator and correlate these variations with the manifest functions, or aims of the school. Such a model for the study of structure works very well when aims are agreed upon and relatively precise, as in the case of the study of an industrial structure.

There are several reasons why this general context may not be easily used for the design of research at the policy-making level of the school system. In the first place, the aims of the school are not agreed upon, and we find that there is disagreement between professional educators and community citizens who control and pay for the school, among community citizens themselves, and even to some extent among professional educators themselves. If this were the only difficulty involved, we might relate the power structure to various functions of the school as they actually happen, and let the educators and citizenry decide upon which of the aims they wish.

However, a second difficulty in the model of studying the structure of the school with relation to the functions is that the aims, even when they are agreed upon in the abstract, are vague and open to considerable disagreement in interpretation. For example, the aim of developing good citizens, to the extent that it is agreed upon, has different meanings to different people. In one context, good citizenship means a conforming citizen. Persons who accept this as the aim of the school usually believe that a high degree of discipline and conformity must be demanded as a means. To others, good citizenship means a creative citizen, and the means are quite different in teaching methods, discipline, and other policy decisions in the school.

A third difficulty in the model in which one would relate structure to function arises in the case of the school because, given the first two difficulties, the implementation of school policy changes that policy. The methods in the school structure, whether these methods exist in the classroom, at the general policy level of curriculum,or anywhere in the structure of the school do not vary greatly. However, as these methods do vary to some extent, we find that the aims toward which the methods were intended seem to change in order to justify the method, that is, policies are changed to build a rationale for continuing extant methods. Therefore, it seems reasonable that at this point in the study of power any model which relates structure to function should take into account means and ends simultaneously. This approach is taken in the subsequent stages on the background of the problem.

C. The Concept of Power

Power is the ability of individuals or groups to determine the behavior of others, even against their wishes. The structure of power within a community refers to the relationships between individuals or groups holding power.

The distinction between power and influence is one which we believe to be deeply involved with philosophical issues on free will, determinism and other concepts of the basic nature of man. A power figure may pound his fist on the table, threaten, and thereby change the behavior of those over whom he is exerting power.

However, such power is effective only to the extent that the person(s) over whom he is exerting power values what he may lose by refusing to conform more than he values what he would gain by not conforming. He may lose his job if, on the school board, he votes for "life adjustment" courses, but these two rewards (his job and courses he would like for his children) are still matters of the hierarchy of values. The fact that the American would ordinarily be expected to rate his job security higher does not take the matter out of the area of values.

In influence, the person supposedly appreciates the arguments of the person doing the influencing. It is unrealistic to assume that such influence is coldly realistic in terms of the warranty of the argument, for other factors operate, including the image of the influencer in the community, the relationship of the two persons involved, and at times the "bait" controlled by the influencer and imagined, by the influenced, to be related in some way to his conforming or agreeing.

Furthermore, we may find that a subordinate in a formal structure listens or anticipates the philosophy of his superordinate in areas outside that formal structure. The bank vice president who is on a school board feels that his votes on school issuesreinforces or hinders his chances in his job if the president of the bank is interested in these issues. We find power operating much more often as a result of, perhaps unnecessary, submission on the part of individuals than as a result of deliberate threats.

For the reasons above, we shall not make careful distinctions between power that is obviously exerted deliberately by power figures and that power which is generated from the desire of an individual or group to please. The desire to please, of course, must be made obvious to warrant the conclusion that power has operated. But the elimination of the "velvet glove dictatorship" at the early stages of the study of the power structure makes a substantive assumption about how power operates and this assumption should be an hypothesis for testing in research.

We may then define power as the ability to influence the courses of action of others even against their wishes, whether or not there is a deliberate attempt on the part of individuals or groups to exercise this power and whether or not an individual or group feels pressure from above or is simply attempting to please. We are saying that power does not necessarily flow along superordinate-subordinate influence structures, but may well involve conflict between or among the structural features of the community political system.

This definition leads to the hypothesis that power operates extensively in the community, and would have much more importance as a factor in determining school policy than would values. Values would be re-defined by the individual over whom power had been exerted if he had permitted self-interest values to take precedence over more altruistic values. Theoretically, then, we may say that power is the most important factor in determining school policy.

Let us turn to the question of whether or not this appears to be so.

D. Power and the Schools

One side of the issue as to the extent of the influence and power that operates in the school system is that at times of crises there is no more important factor. The most widely publicized difficulties in the school system are those in which the community and the school board have confronted the superintendent and the professionals in the school with such cases usually ending in the firing of the superintendent. The tenure of school superintendents in this country is unnecessarily tenuous, and it is highly likely that a large share of resignations when they do occur are involuntary. Furthermore, there are many issues which arise over the hiring and firing of teachers, the tax levels that are to be assessed in the community to support the schools and the like. Such cases invariably involve both the professionals and the community leaders in confrontation.

Given the short tenure of superintendents, we might expect certain consequences:

1. The prospect of short tenure does not encourage long-range programs whose effects may be realized long after the superintendent who initiated the program has been forced to resign. Yet long-range programs are crucial to educational program planning.

2. The prospect of short tenure discourages bold and experimental programs which might greatly improve our understanding of the educational process but which would need strong leadership and

would risk failure, as does any experiment.

3. The prospect of short tenure is likely to draw the attention of the superintendent to "keeping his fences mended" rather than to problems of educational leadership.

4. The prospect of short tenure is likely to have serious implications for the mental health of persons who play a role in our society which requires greater mental balance than do many others.

5. The widespread knowledge of short tenure is likely to have implications for recruitment which eliminate many talented people from entering the profession.

6. Familiarity with the unique aspects of school management in any given community is not likely to be enhanced by short tenure. Indeed, adequate orientation to a particular community may well take a considerable period of time.

7. Doubtless, the "art" of power relations is practiced by all superintendents who enjoy long tenure. This study will make these practices explicit.

8. An additional consequence of short tenure of chief school officers is the development of administrative styles designed "to show results" with little regard for the permanent base from which concrete results should necessarily come.

Another aspect of the school system in which power appears on the basis of research and experience to operate is in the attainment of the manifest function of the schools. The curriculum of the school is ordinarily set for middle class goals, and those who are in power stand to gain from the standard college preparatory curriculum usually emphasized in most school systems. In other words, the school curriculum appears to be designed to perpetuate status differences, whether this be the power structure, the middle class in general, or the lower class. Furthermore, the issues that arise from specific aspects of the curriculum, such as the more provocative or controversial topics treated in social studies classes, usually result in difficulties only when local or powerful members of a community attempt to monitor free inquiry in these matters.

Student evaluation--that is, giving grades--is clearly a function of the school as it is defined by the community generally. However, insofar as the professionals in any one school district prefer a grading system based upon the relationship of achievement to potential, we find that the power structure is usually opposed. This is because the potential employer, not to mention the systems of higher education, need an evaluation based upon sheer achievement regardless of potential. We also find in some research, and much more in gossip, that grades are given differentially to children of the more powerful members of the community. Clearly, these children from the more powerful families often receive higher grades than do those whose parent's occupation and participation in community affairs clearly prohibit the real holding of power. Furthermore, it has been found that these grades are not always given on the basis of talent and performance. For example, in one study it was found that the counseling of parents by teachers was much more often on matters of educational performance and grades when those parents were from the middle class, and much more often on discipline when those parents were from the lower class(12). Since grades were lower among the lower class in the Hollingshead study, one would think that if the subject of counselling sessions was based upon the type of problem involved, there would be more counselling with lower class parents on grades than on discipline. The reverse, of course, was the case.

While class position is not a direct index of power, that is, not all members of the middle class are members of the power structure, nevertheless power figures in the idealized American community likely may be from the middle class or above. Still it may be that lower class views are represented by upper class liberals, i.e., the Kennedys. It is clear that lower class interest and pressure groups such as the Negro organizations are now a power force to be reckoned with in many communities. The entertainment function of the school is usually applauded by the community, and we often find much more community support and enthusiasm for sports teams, class plays and the like than we do for the more serious aspects of education. While there is not enough research to sustain this point irrevocably, we do find allegations that the sons and daughters of the more powerful members of the community are given preference for membership on teams, roles in plays, and the like. Such preference is not "fair". The concept of fairness is perhaps as basic in American culture as is any other criterion of decision making. Therefore, the preference given to the sons and daughters of more powerful members of the community would be problematic in terms of the value system if it were true.

The school, especially in rural communities, has been a symbol of community identification -- it has served as a meeting place, as a source of community cooperation, and often as the identifying name. During the days when centralization was a prime issue in school organization, the power structure of local communities was seen to operate in cases where it had never been seen to operate before in order to prevent the elimination of the symbol of community identification. Again we see reasons for thinking that power is a most important factor, for clearly the evidence was that the larger centralized school could offer a better education for the children.

A further aspect of the school which justifies the study of power as an important factor in the system is that of conflict. The evidence of conflict between school professionals and powerful members of the community or between different factions in the community are easily available in the public press. Attitudes toward God, nationalism, and homework are frequent sources of conflict which bring into confrontation differing factions of power in the community, or confrontations between the power figures of the community and the school professionals.

On the basis of the above descriptions, then, as well as on the basis of the theoretical notions of power, we could expect power to be a most important variable in the study of the school system. Let us turn now to some points which might run counter to our analysis.

In the first place, the alternatives in school policy that are in fact exercised as programs at the local level are not greatly different from one district to another. To be sure, the teaching of reading varies from one place to another, the grading system varies, and the emphasis given to certain courses such as vocational agriculture varies. Nevertheless, the alternatives that are open to the local board are quite circumscribed by the state or federal government. Indeed, the variations in school structure and school operation are much less, even on a regional basis, than are found in any other institution in American society. With so little variation in policies, we could pose the hypothesis that power is a constant--producing uniformity.

A second factor is related to the first. Legally, the state is primarily responsible for school policy and may exercise this responsibility through the factor of state aid to the schools. Standards are set by the state, and because state aid is attached to these standards, much more uniformity in state educational policy is found than would be expected otherwise.

State education departments are run by professionals who have a common philosophy generated by precedents which they see in other states and reinforced by their training in schools of education. Textbooks and professors are not state bound, but rather are part of a national fraternity which has common professional understandings. The superintendent of the local school district may well be a cosmopolite, too, and therefore we find a very large force operating to decrease the amount of variations to be found among local school districts.

Another salient factor which leads us to believe that power may not actually operate as decisively as might be theoretically expected is a growing body of research which indicates that the main factor in the effectiveness of the school, as measured by performance on nationally standardized tests, is the family background of the student. In fact, the most important element found so far in school effectiveness is the socioeconomic background of the student. In other words, one can be a good teacher, or have a good school system, if he has good students who are encouraged to do their homework by the family.

Still another reason power may not be always pervasive derives from the concept of power itself. We mentioned earlier that power is often not exerted overtly, but rather through a seemingly unnecessary submission. To the extent that individuals or groups do not try to ingratiate themselves with others, power may not, indeed, operate in many communities.

Thus we have arguments on both sides of the issue: does power operate, to what extent, and how? These are the basic substantive problems in developing an empirical basis for the theory of power.

E. Review of Related Research

Although there has been a proliferation of studies pertaining to community power patterns in recent years, comparative surveys employing similar research design and methodology in a variety of communities continue to be the exception rather than the rule, and the literature reveals a lack of adequate theory construction as well as conflicting approaches to the case problem, the measurement of power and power relationships. Other than the work of Jennings(14) who employed a different research methodology than the original studies, little replication of original research has occurred, and there appears to be little recognition that there may be several different typologies of power structure depending on local conditions, or that communities may often be characterized as being in a transitional state from one type of structure to another. A related problem involves classifications within the typologies. For example, what is the difference in terms of associations within the community political system of weak and vigorous pluralism, or irregular and constant dominance by an elite? Furthermore, although to study power is certainly to study decision making, the studies generally fail to reflect satisfactory decision-making models applicable to the types of power patterns revealed. While sociologists and political scientists have concentrated on disclosing local associations applicable to stratification theory and political pluralism respectively, little research has concentrated on the interactive elements of political power structures and school organizations in terms of the input, conversion, output and feedback functions of system relationships. More specifically, researches relating different patterns of power structure to functional school organizational designs and personality styles within the school organization lack depth and clarity, and the question remains as to whether community power structure is of any relevance to educational decision making.

Identification of community power structure involves analysis of the degree to which political power is distributed broadly or narrowly throughout the community political system, and the extent to which the ideology of the political leadership is convergent or divergent(24). However, initial studies based on positional methods of identification assumed that those individuals occupying high status roles in the political, economic, social, and cultural activities of the community were also those who most greatly influenced local decision-making processes. Generally, such a procedure involves the assumption of a high correlation between political power and the number of important leadership positions an individual occupies in the community. The Lynds(15), for example, in their classic studies of Middletown (Muncie, Indiana) found power to be concentrated in the hands of an overt economic elite, and apparently passed down ascriptively from generation to generation. Furthermore, even though key local businessmen seemed to be the most influential, the pattern survived the economic upheavals of the 1930's, which one would have suspected to place considerable tension on the system. During the same period, many political scientists were oriented toward concentration on matching governmental structures with constitutional separations of power but they failed to acknowledge that the latter might be invalidated through the dynamic interplay of the structures themselves as well as through the interaction with pressure groups from which much public policy evolves. "Their studies of community governments tended to concentrate on the structure and manifest tasks of governmental units, while largely ignoring the private organizational positions(4).

Floyd Hunter's Community Power Structure(13) published in 1953 accentuated continuing dispute between sociologists and political scientists as to theoretical orientations to power, proper methodology for examining power relationships, and findings in terms of the dispersion or unification of power at the local level. The reputational method employed by Hunter and with some variations by other sociologists involves asking informants to identify the most influential individuals or to nominate those who they perceive to have the most influence. Those individuals receiving the greatest number of nominations by the respondents or those receiving a sum of "votes" above a certain level constitute the community influentials. Hunter found in Regional City (Atlanta, Georgia) that a monolithic power structure of interlocking directorates, composed of some forty individuals exercised general control over virtually all decision-making processes. Furthermore, although relationships were apparent between governmental officials and business and industrial elites, much of the influence in initiation and settlement of local issues appeared to take place behind the scenes among the latter group.

Monolithic power structures where local businessmen, large landholders, or families of relatively high social status tend to control the more important civic organizations and political offices have long been accepted as the case in many rural areas and one-industry communities(25). The dominated community "is generally small and is at an early stage of industrialization in the sense that its economy is composed mainly of locally-owned-and-managed enterprises. It also has a population that is homogeneous along ethnic, religious, and occupational lines, has not experienced unionization in its working class, has a one-party system or its equivalent (there are no organized opposition groups), and does not face the complexity of community-wide problems besetting metropolitan communities and necessitating rational, bureaucratic organizations to deal with them. On this last element, the scope of government in the small community tends to be limited. The community faces a minimum of problems and many are handled by the local capitalists either inside or outside the formal political system. Put another way, there is a fusion of the political, the economic, and the status orders (in Weber's sense) in this type of community(20). Much of the controversy surrounding Hunter's work is due, at least in part, to his similar findings of domination in a highly industrialized, complex, urban area. However, other sociologists employing somewhat similar methodological techniques have also found stratification patterns within community power systems.

Schulze(22) in a study of a "satellite" community, Cibola (Ypsilanti, Michigan), reported that as urban patterns become more complex, the power structure tends to change from a monolithic one dominated by the old economic elites, who owned and controlled local industry and business, to a "bifurcated" structure involving the sharing of decision-making power between local industrial leaders and managers of large absentee-owned corporations, whom he defines as public leaders. According to Schulze, increasing urbanization and the influx of absentee-owned corporations caused the split. However, "the public leaders by no means replaced the economic dominants in the community power structure, nor was their power in local affairs comparable to that once held and wielded by the dominants. For despite their "civic sterilization", the economic dominants were still around. Their potential for control remained considerable, even if their actual exercise of power was superficial, sporadic, or largely dormant(22). Miller(17), in contrast, investigating Pacific City (Seattle, Washington) found a pyramid structure, similar to Hunter's, consisting primarily of economic influentials whose power ranged over many areas of policy. D'Antonio(10) and several associates conducting research in several cities in the Southwestern United States and Mexico found results similar to those of Hunter and Miller. Bonjean, adding interaction analysis to the traditional reputational and/or positional approach, found that "Burlington's leadership structure may be seen as a network of overlapping subgroups, some visible and some concealed, coordinated by one central visible figure(3). Presthus(19), employing reputational methods and some analysis of decisions made in five similar issue areas, compared two New York communities and found the economic subsystem to be a more viable locus of power than the political subsystem. In general terms, the findings reflected above appear to indicate that there are few influentials in many communities, they are often characterized by their invisibility or partial visibility, and leadership from the economic sector tends to be the most frequent.

Of considerable importance to a satisfactory review of the foregoing studies is an understanding of the theoretical base from which analysis was launched. Power can be defined structurally because individual power "must be structured into associational, clique, or institutional patterns to be effective," and "power involves relationships between individuals and groups, both controlled and controlling(13). Furthermore, "power is a relatively constant factor in social relationships with policies as variables", and derivative from that proposition, "wealth, social status and prestige are factors in the 'power constant'", and "variation in the strength between power units, or a shift in policy within one of these units, affects the whole power structure(13). Anton indicates that this sociological concept of power can be summarized as "power exists, and power refers to social, rather than physical, aspects of action(2). Further, he states that the power is stratified along class lines as above, is attached to status, and is unequally distributed among the population. According to Polsby, stratification theorists make the following assertions, each of which is documented from one or more studies, about power in American communities, "(1) the upper class rules in local community life, (2) political and civic leaders are subordinate to the upper class, (3) a single 'power elite' rules in the community, (4) the upper class power elite rules in its own interests, and (5) social conflict takes place between upper and lower classes"(18). Dahl, dissatisfied with the sociologists' concept of power, advanced the initial assumption that "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do"(7). More recently, he has expanded that definition to one quite analogous to the concept of force in mechanics, "the greater the change in some aspect of B's inner or overt behavior that A induces, the greater A's influence over B"(9). Further, Dahl indicated that adequate description of the power relationship must include reference to the bases and means of an actor's power as well as to his scope of response and number of respondents. As Anton(2) points out, the most interesting facet of this approach to power is that it concentrates on the individual actor, and, in addition, the process of the power exercise itself.

The pluralist approach to the study of community power, outlined by Polsby(18), starts with the rejection of the view that anything categorical can be assumed about power in any community. This, then, involves the assumption that there may not be an elite in control, but rather that power may be widely dispersed throughout the system. Hunter's reputational method, as viewed by political scientists, appeared to measure reputation for leadership, perceptions of which play no small role in influencing actions, but does not answer the question of whether those reputed to rule actually do. The pluralist approach is to study specific outcomes of issues and processes of policy decisions in several issue areas. "Pluralists hold that power may be tied to issues, and issues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent"(18). In other words, this rejects the notion that power is permanent. There is a fundamental presumption that much of human behavior is guided by inertia, and overt activity is a more valid indication of involvement in issues than mere reputation(18). Finally, pluralists see "American society as fractured into hundreds of small special interest groups, with incompletely overlapping memberships, widely differing power bases, and a multitude of techniques for exercising influence on decisions salient to them, and are not surprised at the low priority Americans give to their class memberships as bases of social action"(18).

Dahl's(8) study of New Haven involved several different operational measures of influence but key among them was the examination of decisions in three issue areas. Dahl and his associates found that only a small number of individuals exerted a significant amount of influence in more than one issue area, and that most citizens possessed some degree of indirect influence since elected officials tended to keep the real or imagined preferences of constituents in mind during policy formulation. Further, influence tended to be specialized. Individuals who were influential in one area of public activity tended not to be influential in another sector. Further, the social strata from which individuals in one sector are drawn differ from that of individuals in another sector (8). Dahl found no evidence for the existence of an economic or social elite, but rather that power was generally diffused throughout the system with fluid coalitions of interest developing on particular issues. In this setting, Dahl's research reflects that a relatively small group of elected and appointed civil servants exerted the greatest influence over local decisions but within the constraints of the political system. It would appear that these conditions of competitive groups and fluid coalitions of power contradict the findings previously cited of monolithic power elites influencing decision-making processes in a variety of issue areas.

Scoble (23), employing combined methodological techniques, found that data on Bennington indicated no single power structure. "The data suggested that a community is in fact to be characterized by a multiplicity of power structures to be empirically determined among different decisional areas"(23). Rossi (21) questioned Hunter's assumptions that community influentials coming from the same social and economic background will have convergent ideologies.

In fact, there may be enough value conflict among such groups, and representation of other class interests, to make domination illusory. Jennings (14), investigated Atlanta some eight years after Hunter, and employing a method combining reputational, positional, and issue-study approaches to the interaction of economic elites, prescribed influentials, and attributed influentials, he found Atlanta to have a more pluralistic power structure than Hunter had attributed to it.

However, as with the reputational approach, the pluralist approach has some shortcomings. There is little mention of the complex relationships of urban governments to the state or federal governments which might play an important role in shaping local power structures. The question of how much pluralism exists at the local level and how widespread it really is has not been answered effectively. "What, for example, could the pluralist conclude about the community in which no issues ever became subject to public dispute, or in which there was little or no overt political activity?"(2) What about local problems that are stopped by administrators or influentials before they become issues? Incremental decisions made over a period of time at relatively low organizational levels may also be more important than major ones that appear only occasionally in the system. In sum, "the type of power structure identified by studies that rely on a single method may well be an artifact of that method" (26). Furthermore, social integration, region, and economic variables not only relate something about the political life of the community, but also show some association with power structure (26). Finally, important to be considered in construction of a theory of community development and change are a whole myriad of social structure characteristics including population size, degree of industrialization, degree of heterogeneity of population, unionization, scope of local government, political parties, and degree of differentiation of the polity from kinship and economic systems, and to relate these variables to valid typologies of community power structure (20).

In attempting to analyze the results of methodological, demographic, and economic characteristics in terms of the types of power structures discovered in 33 states, Walton establishes four typologies which assist in locating communities more meaningfully. "(1) Pyramidal monolithic, monopolistic, or single concentrated leadership group, (2) Factional - at least two durable factions, (3) Coalition - fluid coalitions of interest usually varying with the issues, (4) Amorphous - absence of any persistent pattern of leadership." (26) Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson (1) moving beyond a synthesis of Dahl and Hunter propose a two-dimensional typology which would seem to bring together the two elements of distribution of political power and leadership ideology reflected in the definition of community power structure earlier. Communities which are convergent in political ideology and possess a broad distribution of power are considered consensual mass communities. Systems convergent in political ideology and narrow in power distribution are labeled

FIGURE 1

TYPES OF POWER STRUCTURE (1)

Distribution of Political Power Among Citizens

Political leadership's ideology	Broad	Narrow
Convergent	Consensual Mass	Consensual Elite
Divergent	Competitive Mass	Competitive Elite

consensual elite communities. Those with divergent political ideologies and broad distributions of power are competitive mass communities. Competitive elite communities are those with divergent political ideologies and narrow distributions of power.

The possibilities for effectively employing such a model become more apparent when one examines the divergence of findings reflected in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2

TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Characteristics and Values of General Community Leaders (24)

		Social Background	
Value and Ideology System		Unified	Diversified
	Unified	Hunter	Agger *et al*
	Diversified	Rossi	Dahl

It is, of course, quite possible that all typologies represented above are reflected in the population of communities. However, comparative research on a broad scale employing similar methodological design is necessary for verification. More important is analysis of the interactive elements of the power structure sub-system and other community sub-systems in terms of the relationships that pertain for local improvement.

F. The Model

It is the view of the present writers that the power structure with which the superintendent must deal is neither as simple nor as uniform as the most popular case studies in sociology and political science might lead one to believe. Rather, we view the power structure as varying from one community to another. Further, we believe this variation in power structure has definite implications both for the structure of the school and for the role of the superintendent.

Sociological literature abounds in a concept of the power structure which is often called the "elite power model" but which we shall call the dominated power structure. This concept holds that the power structure of the community is a pyramid, with a few or even one man at the top. The dominant group may or may not be the economic elite of the community. In matters of "big policy", the power structure directs the course of events in the community. "Big policy" includes school matters. The key point is that opposition viewpoints to the policies advocated by the dominant group toward school affairs do not appreciably influence the behavior of the board or the superintendent in important policy matters. This model of power has been criticized in terms of the requirements of proof, but it may be accepted that at least some communities follow this pattern in leadership relations. Important for the present study design, however, is the possibility of the existence of other types of power structures.

Obviously, the "elite power model" does not allow for conflict between sides of relatively even strength. Yet, there is much evidence that such a situation exists in many communities. The present authors, in a consultative assignment, found not only relatively even sides but the appearance of characteristics of power within each faction similar to those in the single elite power model in the dominated community. This type we shall call the factional power structure. Here there are at least two distinct poles of power. The relationships within each of the two poles are similar to those found in a dominated situation, although the impact of the factional structure on the role of the superintendent differs because there is likely to be a conflict between the factions on issues relating to school affairs.

There is also a considerable amount of evidence that some communities follow neither the dominated nor the factional power model. Rather, the power structure is pluralistic or diffused, with many poles of power. Presumably, there is no single power structure which must be reckoned with for any situation. This we shall call the pluralistic power structure. Power and community interest exist and the superintendent is not free to run the schools as he sees fit, but the power is not overwhelming. The dispersion of power, or the lack of domination, however, does not mean that the schools operate in a laissez-faire manner. On the contrary, there is likely to be high interest in education since people from various strata of the community may have a voice in what goes on.

A fourth type of structure may be found, especially among small rural communities. This type of community exhibits no active power structure, although for our purposes all that is required is that the community exert no active power relations with regard to school matters. Selection of board members, for instance, is likely to be done by finding someone willing to take the job regardless of his qualifications, interests or viewpoints. We shall call this the inert power structure.

Boards of education exhibit a type of decision-making structure which is related to the community power structure. The dominated power structure results in a dominated board. Board members are chosen on the assumption that they will "take the advice" of the community leaders or that they share the ideology of the dominant group. In such a situation, a majority on the board, or perhaps one or two powerful individuals, represents the community elites and exercises power so that policy is made in the "right" direction. In the community in which there is a factional power structure, a factional school board will also be found. Voting is more important than discussion in board meetings, and the majority faction always wins. Members of the board represent the viewpoint of one or the other of the factions and tend to act according to the ideology of the group they represent. One faction or the other may be in control of the board at any one time, but the balance is likely to shift as new members are selected.

In the community with a pluralistic power structure, school board members may often represent "interests", but there is no over-all theme of power influence. Therefore, it is in this type of community where school board members will be active but not rigidly bound to one position. Discussion, often before a motion, is of utmost importance. Board members treat each other as colleagues and are free to act as a group. We shall call this type of board the status congruent school board. Rather than a hierarchy of control within the board, there exists a community of peers whose decisions are characterized by full discussion of problems and arrival at consensus in an atmosphere of detachment from the interests of any particular segment of the community.

In the community with the inert power structure, the school board is inactive and has no philosophical reinforcement from the community. It tends to perform perfunctorily because board members neither represent nor receive reinforcement from citizens for expressing one viewpoint or another. When decisions have to be made, the board tends to follow the lead of the professional staff without going extensively into the appropriateness of a policy in terms of community needs or desires. It simply validates policies presented to it. It is a sanctioning board which does little but exercise its right to approve or reject proposals from the administration.

Now let us bring this conceptual model to the behavior of superintendents. There are certain patterns of activity which, logically, the superintendent must exhibit, and which may be generalized in the analytical sense.

In the dominated community and board, the superintendent must play the role of functionary if he is to act effectively as the integrator of community interests and the school program. He tends to identify with the dominant interests and takes his cues for action from them. He perceives himself as an administrator who carries out policy rather than as a developer of policy. In the factional community and board, the superintendent must work with the majority, but since these communities often change majorities, he must be careful that he does not become identified with one faction too closely. In other words, he must be a political strategist. He takes his cues from the faction exercising power at any particular time, but he behaves in such a way that he can also work effectively with the opposing group when the power balance shifts. Rather than taking a strong stand on controversial issues, he takes a middle course, allowing himself room for retreat. In the community with a pluralistic power structure and status congruent board, the superintendent is expected to give professional advice, based on the best educational research and theory. The board is active but open-minded. He is a professional adviser. He is not limited to carrying out policy handed down to him nor is he forced to shape his opinions according to the ideology of the group in power. His approach can be more statesmanlike in the sense that he can express to the board alternatives to any policy and he can delineate the consequences of any action openly and objectively.

In the community with the inert power structure and the sanctioning board, the superintendent "calls the shots" and the board becomes merely a "rubber stamp". In this case the role of the superintendent is that of decision maker. He does not have to take cues from any dominant group nor is he called in for technical advice as a basis for decision. Because of the lack of interest on the part of the board, the superintendent is not only free to initiate action in substantive matters, but he must do so if the program is to be effective.

The conceptual model may be summarized as follows:

Community Power Structure	School Board	Role of the Superintendent
Dominated	Dominated	Functionary
Factional	Factional	Political Strategist
Pluralistic	Status Congruent	Professional Adviser
Inert	Sanctioning	Decision Maker

G. Hypotheses

The conceptual model presented in the previous section will be tested empirically by the following directional hypotheses:

1. A dominated community power structure is most often accompanied by a dominated school board.

2. A factional community power structure is most often accompanied by a factional school board.

3. A pluralistic community power structure is most often accompanied by a status congruent school board.

4. An inert community power structure is most often accompanied by a sanctioning school board.

5. A dominated school board is most often accompanied by the role of functionary being played by the superintendent.

6. A factional school board is most often accompanied by the role of political strategist being played by the superintendent.

7. A status congruent school board is most often accompanied by the role of professional adviser being played by the superintendent.

8. A sanctioning school board is most often accompanied by the role of decision maker being played by the superintendent.

9. A dominated community power structure is most often accompanied by a role of functionary being played by the superintendent.

10. A factional community power structure is most often accompanied by a role of political strategist being played by the superintendent.

11. A pluralistic community power structure is most often accompanied by a role of professional adviser being played by the superintendent.

12. An inert community power structure is most often accompanied by a role of decision maker being played by the superintendent.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

This study deals heavily with the interactions between people and between groups of people. The relationships among the roles of people within a community, the roles of school board members, and the role performed by the superintendent are all sociological in character. Similarly, the relationship of the power structure to the school board and to the superintendent is also social in character. The methods employed in sociological studies, therefore, are appropriate to the analysis of the data in the present study.

Most current sociological studies employ relatively sophisticated techniques, although not so sophisticated as those employed in psychology and economics. It has not been long since sociology was using interpretive analysis, case analysis, and other data gathering procedures less structured than those currently lending themselves to the more advanced statistical and mathematical processes. We believe that the progress from interpretive case analysis to intricate statistical analysis depends not so much upon the development of these ingenious techniques as upon a better knowledge of the phenomena under study.

At the time when sociological studies were primarily interpretive, unstructured, and single cases, there were imaginative statistical techniques available to the sociologist. The reason he did not employ them was simply that the use of these techniques assumes a considerable understanding of the phenomena under study. At the beginning of the development of any special area of inquiry, therefore, it is incumbent that we use those methods which are most likely to give us valid results at that time. Later, we may gradually and profitably introduce more preferred techniques.

In the present study, we have made a considerable advance in sampling beyond the single case analysis characteristic of power studies in the past. In this connection, a few researchers have made comparisons among two, three, or four cases, but these instances are rare. Still we have not met the conditions of sampling characteristic of those areas where knowledge is relatively advanced.

We have also made marked improvements in the characterization of community power structures and the structure of school boards. This progress has been effected by using judges who have each taken several interviews in the community and who must classify the community according to a variable structure of power and decision making. This use of judges, however, does not meet the high standards of some quantitative instruments of observation used with individuals and families.

We have also been able to apply statistics to test the significance and measure the size of correlations between community power structure and school board structure, and between each of these and the role played by the superintendent. We have been able to make gains only because individual case studies were conducted before us.

The statistics we employ, however, are necessarily crude. We anticipate that this study will point the way to a more definitive research of power structures.

For the reasons given above, we must, therefore, address ourselves to two questions:

(1) the usual question of how we proceeded so that our study may be interpreted with the proper reservations and may be replicated;

(2) the question of what our experience has taught us about the use of the older sociological method in furthering the development and testing of the theory of power.

A. Selection of Communities

1. The Unit of Analysis

We are dealing both with the geographical area within which the school board and superintendent have jurisdiction and with the more generally socially meaningful groupings in which well organized power structures might operate. Since the boundaries of school districts and viable communities frequently do not correspond perfectly, the selection of the unit of analysis for this study presented a problem.

We decided to ameliorate this problem by making the school district the unit of analysis and studying the largest community center in that district in terms of power. This procedure worked out well in all but a few cases, provided the community center was defined to include the lesser communities within the district.

The exceptions occurred when a single school district had two community centers or none. In these cases, we considered the school district community as the focus rather than any particular political or social center within the school boundaries. One illustration may show the importance of this loosening of the definition of the unit of analysis: a centralized school district, in which the schools of two communities have been integrated, may experience factionalism as a result of having two community centers. In such cases, we interviewed power figures from both communities.

Ideally, we wanted to find out how power operated within the school district community no matter how that community was politically or geographically organized. For this reason, we looked at the population and groupings within all of the area covered by the school district which might include one large community, many small ones, two centers of equal size, or none.

2. Definition of the Population

The population to which the hypotheses of this study apply consists of all of the school districts in the United States. Theoretically, all of these districts should have been sampled. In this way, regional variations in social structure, culture, and laws could have been treated as independent variables affecting the operation of power.

As in most studies, the population had to be severely limited because of problems of funds and the like. It was, therefore, decided to limit the study to only two regions of the United States, the Northeast and the Midwest.

A further limitation was made on the basis of the nature of the model itself. Only those school districts in which the superintendent had been in his present position for at least two years were drawn in the final sample.

School board members and community power figures would be unable to perceive accurately the leadership role of the school superintendent if he had only recently assumed office. The superintendent furthermore could give much less information about attempts at influence exerted by community influentials or the operational patterns of relationships established by the school board. There would not have been enough time for him to perceive the patterns and early in the tenure of a given superintendent (the so-called honeymoon period) his relationships with his board and community are different from those that develop through time.

This limitation actually resulted in a major change in definition of the population. Originally, there was an intention to remain within one state in the Northeast region and one state in the Midwest. Both of the largest cities in the Midwest state, however, had changed superintendents recently, a fact which would serve to disqualify these two cities from inclusion in the study. Our design called for a wide range of school districts by size, thus the Midwest population was extended to include communities in two contiguous states.

A similar decision was made in the Northeast, but for a different reason. It has been predicted by several professional persons familiar with the school situation in the Northeast state selected that an unusually high proportion of inert power structures might be expected. When the prediction came true, we decided that three contiguous states should be included. Therefore, in both regions, we found ourselves beyond the unknown influence of the constant that we would like to have gone beyond in the first place--the restrictions of state law. In the present study we cannot treat state law as a variable, but at least its influence is scattered throughout the cases.

3. Designing the Sample

It was agreed upon by the researchers and the sponsoring agency that approximately fifty cases would be sufficient to test the model and the relationships the model predicts. It was decided that approximately half of the communities (school districts) should come from each of the two regions. Actually 26 came from the Midwest and 25 from the Northeast.

With so few cases,the possibility of a stratified sample seemed more appealing. The stratification that seemed most appropriate from our experience was that of size and type of community.

Accordingly, the final sample consisted of a relatively equal number of cases in each region from each of four community types: rural, small city, suburban, and large urban. The final results confirmed the expectation that these size-type variations would affect the type of power and school board found.

Had a completely random sample of communities been used, we could discuss the relative frequency of types of power and structures of school boards. For the reasons given above, we decided to extend the study to contiguous states after the study was underway. Thus, we had to choose between the relative frequency of types and a sufficient number of each type to indicate the relationships within it. We chose the latter.

Therefore, in this study, we do not seek parameters but rather attempt to analyze relationships which will allow us better to seek parameters in the future. Otherwise, the test of the model would have been impossible, given the number of cases we were able to study.

The decision to forego parameters in order to obtain adequate numbers of each community type resulted in a less than even distribution of cases in each grouping. The final distribution is presented in Table 1. The decision, however, helped considerably in providing a sufficient number of cases of each type of power structure (Table 2), each type of school board (Table 3), and each type of role (Table 4), and thereby minimized the risk of generalizing from completely unique cases.

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS BY SIZE OR TYPE OF COMMUNITY CENTER

Size or Type of Community Center	Number of School Districts
Large Urban, above 25,000	11
Small Urban, 2,500-24,999	14
Suburban	10
Rural, under 2,500	16
TOTAL	51

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURES

Type of Community Power Structure	Number of Communities
Dominated	8
Factional	7
Pluralistic	23
Inert	13
TOTAL	51

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF SCHOOL BOARD STRUCTURES

Type of School Board	Number of School Boards
Dominated	8
Factional	10
Status Congruent	22
Sanctioning	11
TOTAL	51

TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF TYPES OF ROLES OF SUPERINTENDENTS

Type of Role	Number of Superintendents
Functionary	8
Political Strategist	9
Professional Adviser	21
Decision Maker	13
TOTAL	51

4. The Selection of Leaders

The selection of the superintendent and the school board members was automatic upon the selection of the community. The selection of community leaders, however, involved making assumptions which have not been fully tested. In general, the reputational method used in so many sociological studies was employed. The interviewing began with the superintendent, and he was asked to suggest the names of important people in the community with respect to school issues. We always sought out some positional leaders such as the city manager, newspaper editors, and the like. The interviewing then proceeded with the members of the school board, and they were similarly asked to suggest names. Finally, nominations were obtained from the community leaders themselves. Two criteria were used in selecting the community leaders by the reputational method. First was simply the number of times the person's name was mentioned by the superintendent, the school board members, and other influentials. In other words, if a person were mentioned by everyone concerned he clearly would be interviewed. If a person were mentioned only once or twice, he would probably not be interviewed. The exception to this procedure came when a person whose name was not mentioned often as a community leader was associated with some event or some faction in such a way that the influence or power relationship might be there regardless of whether many people knew about it.

An example of a selection of the least frequently mentioned leaders may be illustrated as follows: Quite often, the president of the parent teachers association was named as a person of influence in educational matters. If the nomination was solely based on the quasi-administrative post, such a person was not considered to be a community influential and was not interviewed. A community member might be nominated, however, by one respondent only. Let us say that a school board member, the most influential member of his group, mentioned that he had dinner with a certain person and school issues quite often came up. We would then interview the person identified even though he had been suggested only once. In the general case, however, the reputational method as normally employed was used in the present study.

5. Statistical Procedures

In the exploratory research involved in the development of any relatively new area of sociology, there has been a tendency in previous studies either to ignore statistical analysis completely or to force data into sophisticated procedures that give these data only the appearance of precision, elegance of design and requisite validity and reliability. In the present study, an attempt is made to use some statistical devices but to use simpler procedures where such are available.

In testing the model itself, the requirement is that a nonparametric statistic be used for testing the significance of any correlation coefficient, since there was no attempt to search for parameters of the various types of communities, school boards, and roles. The selection of the test of significance was partly determined by the type of correlation coefficient that was available for an R by C table. Four types are posited in the community, four in the school board structure, and four in the role of the superintendent. These types are not ranked on a basis of any type of underlying dimension, but simply differ qualitatively with respect to the manner in which power is exercised, decisions are made, and roles are played. There is, however, a pattern of frequencies that is dictated by the nature of the model which requires that, if the model is to be confirmed, there must be a heavy concentration in certain cells of the table and very little concentration of "errors" in other cells of the table.

The coefficient of contingency has been employed in studies with similar data in the past. However, it was decided phi-coefficient would be more appropriate for use in the present study (11). Like the coefficient of contingency, the phi-coefficient employs chi-square as a test of significance and the chi-square itself is used in the computation of the phi-coefficient for R by C. The formula for phi is as follows:

$$\text{Phi}' = \sqrt{\frac{\text{chi}^2}{N}(L-1)}$$

when L is the smaller of rows or columns. The chi-square is the usual one for four by four tables, in which the computation is based on the difference between expected frequencies and observed frequencies. Traditionally, in social research, tables are collapsed into fewer rows and columns when some expected frequencies are below five. However, a study by Cochran (6) indicated that such a reduction in rows and columns was not necessary when some of the expected frequencies were above five in a more than two by two table. The findings of the Cochran study were employed in the present analysis and, because of the importance of studying each category independently, the chi-squares were computed in spite of the fact that some expected frequencies were below five.

Clearly, the logic of inference about communities is identical to the logic of inference about individuals, and the sampling procedures should be the same. However, the complex nature of community power and the inordinate time and skill required to elicit adequate data from community leaders would require much more funding than was available in the present study for inferring relationships with the statistical rigor that has been established in studies of individuals, families, and the like. Such a larger sample will be possible as more is learned about the measurement of power and its operation.

The criticism of the use of rigorous statistical devices may be offered on several grounds at this stage in the development of the theory of power:

1. In most communities in which power appears to us to operate, we find only sporadic exercise of power, that is, at those times when "big policy" is involved. Therefore, a cross-sectional statistical measure of "indices" of power would likely miss the times at which the power structure comes into play. Most of the time the

bureaucratic structure of the school system is impervious to external pressure but not when it counts.

2. The selection of personnel to "front" for the power structure in decision making is a loose one, and it appears to follow the pattern of "anyone can do it if they do not rock the boat". Therefore, the restrictions are more in the negative than in the positive direction. In sum, there are a few people not acceptable rather than a few people who are acceptable.

3. Power is exercised in an extremely wide variety of ways: therefore, the criteria by which counting and cross-tabulation could be done are, at this moment, impossible.

B. Techniques Employed: Problems and Contributions

The procedures which we used placed great emphasis upon the skill of individual interviewers and stressed efficient planning by our office staff prior to each field visit. Interviews for the superintendent of schools, every board member, and certain positional influentials were scheduled in advance. Accordingly, we made the most of our time in the field. Once located on the research site, we proceeded to contact reputational influentials. One of the most surprising aspects of this phase of the research process was the amazing acceptance rate of on-the-spot interviews. This success we attributed to our initial interview with the superintendent in which we emphasized the purpose of our study and assured him that anonymity of persons and community would be strictly maintained. For instance, when interview contacts were a bit suspicious of our intentions, they frequently telephoned the superintendent to inquire about the study. His support was sufficient to validate our academic respectability, no small task in modern American society where individuals have grown wary of the telephone interview. It is often a prelude to a sales pitch for an unwanted product. Let us look for a moment in some detail at the contributions made by our key techniques.

1. Focused Interviews

The questionnaire was rejected as a data collecting device for this study. Respondents were not likely to chronicle in their own handwriting recollections of their decision-making process and the eddies and currents surrounding it. Neither were purely objective items suitable for the wide range of variables we were considering. Finally, we needed to obtain ready access to all the key respondents in each community we studied. For these reasons we selected the personal interview.

At the same time we did not want to fall into the trap of a highly structured schedule which would tend to yield surface data. Rather we chose the focused interview made famous by Merton and his colleagues (16). We did not, of course, free associate. In the Appendix is found the interview schedule we employed. It is made up of a number of semi-structured questions designed to elicit significant data about power configurations. The schedule was intended to be flexible and to exploit the talents of our carefully selected staff of interviewers. When a respondent moved into a fruitful area of inquiry, we instructed the interviewers to use probes and to follow his lead. Each team, usually consisting of four people, was able to share information as the interviews progressed in each community. Gaps and misinformation were thus explored more fully in a subsequent interview.

2. Tape Recorded Research

It has been well established by opinion researchers (5) that the tape recorder has a number of advantages to the interviewer. He loses no material, he is free to concentrate on the substance of his schedule, and his own selective bias is eliminated. More important, for our purposes, was the opportunity to share information. After each interview, each researcher returned to our field headquarters and another researcher listened to the tape of the previous interview. In this way, the team members were able to improve their own interviewing, both substantively and procedurally. Areas to probe became obvious and errors in interviewing technique were easily noted. Perfunctory interviews are just not tolerated in such a setting. The work was difficult, but it was exciting. To interview people from many walks of life in a number of different communities is an unusually rewarding experience. The tape recorder has the added advantage of capturing this material permanently. We have the interviews for all fifty-one communities on master tapes.

The argument that tape recorders inhibit the respondent did not seem to apply to our study. Occasionally we sent one of our interviewers out on assignment with instructions to make notes and write up the findings. Naturally, quality and intensity of response is partly a function of the interview subject and not the method used. Still, allowing for this factor, we could not distinguish any difference in the type of data we were able to accumulate by either method. Certainly, reconstructed interview data is no match for a taped interview on any other score.

In a study of the intricacy of ours, it is often necessary to mine data intensively. Replaying of a tape permits attention to a number of significant items (pauses, choice of words, and the like) which would go unnoticed in a regular interviewing situation.

From a replication standpoint these interview data are matchless. Any researcher is free to replay the types and examine our conclusions using the same data we did.

C. Critique of Research Methods in the Study of Power

Some of the methods used here are more sophisticated than those found in most studies of power, but far from the level of sophistication found in studies of less cumbersome units of analysis. In the following pages, we will discuss some of the "soft" methods used in this and other power studies as our experience in this study leads us to assess them. It must be remembered that we are discussing these methods from the point of view of the exploratory nature of all current work on power.

1. Interviewing and the Use of Informants

The purpose of the interviews in the present study was somewhat different from that of most survey research. Ordinarily, every interview is equally important, and the data elicited from the respondent is treated with equal weights. The interviewee tells the researcher about himself and the researcher draws the conclusions as to general principles confirmed by the data. For example, we interviewed board members whose tenure was as short as three months. It is reasonable to assume that only a few of the short tenure board members would have experienced any type of power relationship or influence from the community or would have sensed the influence being exerted on the superintendent.

Third, in communities in which there was factionalism or domination, the theory of power indicates that there should be attempts to "cover up" certain types of power relationships. There are many variables which influence the ability of the respondent to deny the exercise of power. (a) In some communities a few respondents were able to maintain their poise and savoir faire during the entire interview without revealing one untoward incident, even in the face of probes based on data obtained in previous interviews. (b) Another conspicuous factor was the skill of the interviewer. Some interviewers were clearly more able to elicit data concerning the power and influence relationships in the community than were other interviewers. (c) There is another set of elements that needs to be studied in future studies of power. Regardless of the apparent intent of the respondent, there was some variation in the ability of each interviewer from one interview to the next to elicit data on power relationships. For example, in one interview an opening would be presented in which the interviewer would be able to "zero in" on a power relationship that had occurred in the community. After the opening, the respondent suddenly exposed a series of events which indicated a rather persistent power relationship existing. In the very next interview a similar opening would occur, and the interviewer was unable to take advantage of the situation and expose the data which he, himself, had heard reported in a previous interview. Of course, part of this can be explained in terms of the personality of the respondent, but openings occurred with patterns of similarity and still it appeared that the situation was "just not right". There may be a certain "match" between interviewer and respondent.

The fourth reason for not treating each interview with equal weight is the fact that the power structure itself influences the ability to elicit data on power. In a dominated community in which the domination is assured and unchallenged, the power figures in the community feel sufficiently secure to be willing to expose the patterns of domination. However, when the domination is being challenged, or when the respondent feels that moral codes of conduct have been violated, it is more difficult to elicit the patterns of power relationships. Similarly, in the factional community the greater the personal conflict that is associated with the factions, the greater the ability to elicit data which would assure one of classifying the community as factional. If we may be permitted an over-generalization, perhaps we could say that hate breeds validity in the factional community.

In sum, then, the interviews were used in a manner analogous to the biologist's use of a microscope. The interviews told us about events that had occurred. For this reason, the interviews were sources of data, and to the extent that they did not give us useful data we did not consider them of equal weight to other interviews.

Perhaps a word of caution should be offered in interpreting the above. A series of interviews indicating that no power relationships have existed and that the board largely takes the recommendations of the professional they have hired to make such recommendations, would lead to the classification of a community as inert in power structure and to a classification of a school board as sanctioning. But, in a series of twelve interviews with community leaders, we may find that three or four respondents tell us of specific events in which the exercise of power and influence was apparent. An astute interviewer will be able to follow up in such instances to see whether such events actually occurred. One common check is the correspondence in responses given by two respondents to two different interviewers. If such validity of the reporting of the event can be established, even though the other eight interviews in the example above report no such event, then these eight interviews are considered to be for some reason or another less valid than those which do report the event. Of course, for the sake of scientific caution, the reverse situation may also be true. In interviews with, say, five school board members, four may report little difficulty on the board, and one may report extreme discrimination against him and his interests. We would conclude that this would be a type of board other than factional, but with a malcontent, unless, of course, we could get data to verify the "malcontent's" perception.

Many people feel that information on such subjects as sex and power cannot be discussed honestly by an interviewee. After our interviewing experience with respondents in this study, it is our opinion that, in general, people do attempt to tell the truth as they see it, provided that acceptable means of establishing rapport are used.

Another important point is that we were not seeking the attitudes of the respondents, but rather we sought factual events which would indicate the exercise of power. Suppose we interview at random one hundred people in a community about a meeting held by the top members of the power structure in which was planned how to change the school board at the next election. It is entirely possible that ninety of these people would report that no such meeting had occurred because they would not know about it. If one person reports such a meeting, however, we may then pursue with subsequent respondents the matter as to whether the meeting was held and what happened. If two or three people verify that the meeting was held, that certain things were said, and that certain things followed, then we may assume that it happened, and that this is the way power operates. In the truly exploratory study, we must develop knowledge on the basis of the most valid reports we can obtain, and hope that in the development of this knowledge we may later get more precise and rigorous techniques which will be based upon valid notions of how power operates. To do otherwise would be to reverse the importance of validity and precision.

2. Use of Judges in Classification of Events

In the situation described in the immediately previous section, it is clearly of paramount importance to have interviewers and judges who are extremely sensitive to the social situation with respect to power and influence, and also extremely objective in attempting to classify each community. Clearly, the knowledge of the model itself could easily have a halo effect and influence people to see power where none existed. For this reason, several precautions were taken, and several checks can be made to determine the extent to which the findings can be accepted at face value.

It was the original intent in this study to select interviewers who would complete all of the interviews in the same community within a short period of time and would then sit down in joint conference while still in the field and judge the type of community, the type of school board, and the type of superintendent. This judgment would then be checked by another set of judges who would listen to the tapes or read the taped interviews and would replicate the judgment or classification. The line of reasoning in this procedure was that the second set of judges, since they were not as intimately involved in the study itself, would be a check on the first set of judges who were the interviewers. The concern was that the interviewers, being graduate students who were employed by the directors of the study, would unconsciously attempt to "fit" each community, school board, or superintendent into one of the classes suggested by the model. Furthermore, another hazard was that once the interviewers had fitted the data into one of these classes, there would be a tendency for a halo effect to occur from one class to another. For example, finding a dominated community would lead them to look for a dominated board and a superintendent playing a role of functionary.

Some interesting events occurred during the early part of the interviewing which led the researchers to reverse the decision described in the previous paragraph and decide that the involvement and commitment of the interviewers was such that there was even less likelihood of these people forcing the data to fit the model than a set of judges who had not been in the field. There are several reasons for this decision.

First, we were fortunate in that some of the first communities studied, both in the pretest of procedures and in the early sample communities, did not fit the pattern suggested by the model. We were also fortunate in that the field chiefs did not inform the research directors of this development. In arranging for the various contacts in the community, and for other types of facilities connected with the study, the research directors did not check on the conclusions and judgments that were made on the first four or five communities in the sample itself. After an additional four or five communities were studied, the field chiefs commented that the communities were now fitting the model better. Since this admission was given gratuitously, our attention was directed to the general pattern of classifications that had been assigned up to that time. We ascertained that there was, first, a deliberate attempt on the part of the interviewers not to make the classifications fit the model. Furthermore, we found that they had been successful to some extent in this attempt. Still again, we discovered that the interviewers were thinking of other patterns of classifications than those suggested by the model.

Second, it was the judgment of the two research directors that the reports from the interviewers indicated a great deal of psychological commitment to the study and to the problem of the study, but an honest skepticism of the model itself. The interviewers became vitally concerned about what actually was going on in the communities with respect to power and influence, a condition which might be described as an "empirical loyalty".

Third, the research directors discovered that the marked involvement and the vigorous search for facts on the part of the interviewers in each community was much more intense than is ordinarily the case in survey research with structured questions. For example, a great amount of time spent in the field was involved in lengthy discussions late into the night on the nature of that particular community, that particular school board, or of the role played by that particular superintendent. It was concluded, and verified by the field chiefs in each of the two regions, that more time was actually spent in judging each community than was spent in interviewing, even though the interviewing consumed a great amount of time. The intense involvement of the interviewers at this period allowed them to judge nuances of voice, of expression, of inconsistencies in individual interviews, and resulted in a great deal of familiarity with each other's interviews. For example, each of our interviewers would sit down and listen to at least two or three tapes which were taken by another interviewer. The classification, then, was made of the community, the school board and the superintendent on the basis of this very full and thorough knowledge of what had happened in the community and in the interviews.

In a series of discussions between the co-directors of the study, the question finally settled around whether we would trust the judgments of any source which disagreed with the interview team. Given the tremendous involvement and thorough familiarity with events which could never be communicated by a typewriter or tape record, would a panel of judges, or a series of questionnaires, or any such "second source" of judgment be accepted as more valid than that of the interviewers, should disagreement occur? The feeling of both co-directors of the study was that in case of disagreement, they would almost invariably support the team of interviewers. Therefore it was concluded that a second panel of judges was merely extra effort to give the appearance of scientific caution, but served no function of valid classification because in case of disagreement such judgments would be considered the wrong ones.

The decision to eliminate second panels of judges on the basis of a greater trust in the interviewer team's judgment was tested on an interviewing team. Without letting the interviewer team in the Midwest know the purpose of the discussion, the co-director in the Midwest attempted to indicate that a certain community or school board was of a certain type. In a series of discussions the interviewers were able to defeat the classification which differed with their own in such quick fashion and with such concrete description of events that the decision described in the previous paragraph was made final.

In spite of the seeming reasonableness of the judgment made, it was decided to introduce slightly different procedures in the two geographical areas to see if different results occurred. In the Midwest, the judgment was made by the team, and, although minority reports were allowed, a team judgment or a group decision was made. In the few cases where one member of the team still held out for a different classification, this classification was reported in the group decision. In the Northeast, the procedure was different. There was discussion among the interviewers as to what had occurred in the community, the school board, and the like. However, the classifications were private votes on the part of the members of the interviewer team. This difference in procedure was expected to eliminate the influence that might be exerted by unusually articulate members of the interviewer team, although there is no reason to believe that the articulate members would be more likely to support than to reject the model as fitting any given community.

The results of this variation in research methods were not surprising. Two differences appear. The first is that, as would be expected, there was somewhat more disagreement in the Northeast, where individual votes were taken, than there was in the Midwest where a group decision was arrived at after a lengthy discussion. The extent of discussion was determined by the amount of time needed to arrive at some consensus. However, the deviant votes were as often in favor of fitting the pattern of the model as they were diverging from it. In other words, suppose we have a factional community, a factional board, and a superintendent attempting to play the role of the decision maker. About half of the disagreements involved the majority trying to classify the superintendent as a political strategist to fit the model, with the minority member or members of the interviewer team claiming that the superintendent was attempting to play the role of decision maker. The other half of the cases were the reverse, where the minority members tried to make the community fit the model and the majority group indicated that this community was a deviation. Still another feeling of comfort comes from the fact that even in the Midwest where consensus was attempted, minority members still on occasion persisted in their deviant view. The reasons for this, naturally, are of research interest in further studies. The overwhelming influence of one particular interview, or of one particular event in the community, may have been the salient factor.

Of course, the obvious precautions were taken. The interviewers were assured and indeed urged not to try to make data fit the patterns or even the classifications suggested by the model. In the selection of interviewers, there was an attempt to find persons who gave the appearance of being sufficiently submissive to elicit the data needed in the interview but who were sufficiently aggressive to differ with the research directors on substantive issues. The training in interviewing was given by the field chiefs who themselves were relatively independent and autonomous men. This, we hoped, would decrease the influence of the research directors and their identification with the model. All of the interviewers were graduate students who presumably have been socialized into the scientific attitude to varying degrees.

Regardless of the slight differences in method, the percentage of communities which fit or did not fit the patterns suggested by the model was equal in the two regions using the two classification techniques. The different procedures would be especially important in studies in which the relative frequencies in each type of pattern were a major problem of the research.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

A. Community Power Structure and the School Board

1. Dominated Structure

The first hypothesis was that a dominated power structure in the community would be associated with a dominated structure in the school board. Underlying this hypothesis is the argument that school issues often represent important policy. This is plausible for several reasons. In the first place, there are more people involved and there is more money in the budget of the school system than in nearly any other enterprise in the community. Therefore, tax policies, of considerable interest to economic dominants, are an important determinant of the school program. Furthermore, school pride and the school as a symbol of community identification are central to the interests of the community power structure, for power figures are community minded either from self-interest as businessmen or as taxpayers, or from genuine citizenship interest in the community welfare itself. Hence, any dominated power structure should assure itself of representation on the board of education as a means of implementing its particular philosophy.

Within the limitations set by the methodology of this study, the hypothesis above was confirmed (see Table 5). Dominated power structures in communities were more often associated with dominated structures in the school board.

In all, 8 communities were classified by the judging teams as dominated. Of these 8, 5 had school boards that were classified as dominated. The degree of domination, however, seemed to vary, and to the degree that it varied there were commensurate difficulties in the classification. In some communities in which the domination was obvious, the classification did not involve much argument or debate in the Midwest region, nor did it involve dissenting votes on the part of certain judges in the Northeast. In communities in which the domination was either more subtle or sporadic, lengthy discussions were involved in the classification in the Midwest, and there were some dissenting votes on the part of some judges who disagreed with the majority in the Northeast.

TABLE 5

RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNITY POWER AND STRUCTURE OF THE SCHOOL BOARD

	School Board Structure				
Community Power Structure	Dominated	Factional	Status Congruent	Sanctioning	Total
Dominated	5	1	1	1	8
Factional	0	6	0	1	7
Pluralistic	2	2	18	1	23
Inert	1	1	3	8	13
Total	8	10	22	11	51

Chi Square = 45.513
$P < .001$
Phi = .54

Still another feature of the difficulties in classification of domination arises when a community is in transition. We expected, in such a case, to find factionalism emerging from domination, with the dominant group being challenged by some group within the community whom they had dominated in the past. An example would be the rapid development of labor unions to challenge the domination of managerial groups. Another possible example of the change from domination to factionalism would be a rapid influx of migrants into a molecular community, usually involving a split between more cosmopolitan migrants and conservative long-time residents.

There was some indication of such transitions. In one community, the liberal in-migrants were challenging the long-time conservatives, but the transition had been in process long enough to have the community classified as factional. In another community the dominating figures had been in power for so many years that they no longer watched school board elections closely. In this case, the school board became factional even though this faction was not able to sustain enough power to warrant the classification of the community as factional. This was one of the three communities in which dominated community power structures were not associated with dominated school boards.

Another community in which the power structure of the community was classified as dominant appeared not to be interested in the domination of the school board. The board members were thus able to operate as a status congruent board, debating issues on the grounds of the welfare of the system and of the children involved. The detached attitude of the dominants does not mean that their influence might not be wielded if a suitable situation should arise.

In still a third community in which dominated power structure was not followed by a dominated board, the power structure dealt directly with the superintendent. The superintendent in this case was classified as a decision maker, although there was some evidence to indicate that he listened closely to certain power figures in the community. In a sense, the superintendent was the representative of the dominated power structure at the school board meetings.

In summary, then, the hypothesis that dominated community power structures are more often followed by dominated structures in the school board was confirmed with five of eight such communities fitting the pattern. The other 3 communities followed other patterns although it could be suggested in at least 2 of these communities that there are difficulties to be expected in the future because of one type of community power structure and another type of school board.

2. Factional Structure

The second hypothesis stated that factional communities are more often followed by factional school boards (see Table 5). Underlying this hypothesis is the reasoning that the school arena is one in which factions may represent the philosophies and interests on which they are based. If school affairs are important policy for dominated structures, and if the general interest in school issues is high because of the amount of involvement of people and the amount of money involved, then this would seem to be an arena within which factions would be more than unusually interested. If the factions in the community were interested, clearly they would try to get their own candidates on the school board. Indeed, the election of a school board member would indicate to the citizenry generally that the faction was to be reckoned with. Therefore, school board election would be a channel or an outlet for factional rewards to be given to the faithful.

This hypothesis was confirmed in the data, with seven communities identified as factional. Six of these were judged to have factional school boards. In these six cases the philosophies and allegiance of faction representatives on the school board were consistent with the philosophies and allegiance of factions in the community power structure.

One of the characteristics of school board members on a factional school board is that self-consciously they are representatives of a faction. While it was impossible to get every member of the factional board to admit this explicitly, it was possible to get a majority of the board members to admit their allegiance and also the nature of the structure of the board. The rapport established plus the length of the interview made it difficult for respondents to hide their allegiance completely. A surprising aspect of these interviews was not so much that respondents were not able to hide their factionalism, but that they were so willing to admit it. Indeed, even in cases in which there was a great deal of personal emotion involved between factions, respondents in the interview situation were able to state the philosophy and system of thought of members of the opposite faction with an unusual amount of understanding. Most factional school board members as well as community leaders were able to refer to "the other side" as if the opposing faction had a position that one could legitimately believe in--even though it was wrong.

One of the difficulties in finding factional communities is that factionalism appears to be much more sporadic than the other structures. Some communities, which by reputation had been extremely factional over certain issues in recent months, were not judged to be factional by our techniques. Thus it may be hypothesized that a factional community may be either factional all of the time with respect to school issues, or may revert to some other structure during the interim between periods when factional issues arise. Both types, the persistent and the sporadic, were found in the present study.

In summary, then, the hypothesis that a factional community power structure is more often associated with a factional structure in the school board was confirmed, with six of seven communities being classified in the expected manner.

3. Pluralistic Structure

The third hypothesis was that pluralistic communities would more often be followed by status congruent school boards. Underlying this hypothesis is the reasoning that a community in which the power structure is characterized by many small groups would experience unusual interest and participation in school policy deliberations. Furthermore, such interest groups would be sufficiently active to keep the school board a debating society on school issues. Moreover, the task orientation of a status congruent board, listening carefully and debating issues in terms of the criteria it has for the aims of the school, would be the only structure of decision-making that the school board could logically be expected to follow.

By far the greatest number of communities (23 out of 51) were classified as pluralistic (see Table 5). Similarly, 22 of the 51 school boards were classified as status congruent. Most of these were in the Northeast section, where the technique seemed to be mobilized in the direction of pluralistic and status congruent classifications. This was discussed in the previous chapter on methodology.

In general, the hypothesis that pluralistic community power structures are more often followed by status congruent boards was confirmed. Of the 23 communities classified as pluralistic, 18 were judged to have status congruent school boards. The pluralistic communities which did not have status congruent school boards were evenly divided among the other three classes.

Insofar as the interest groups can align themselves fairly consistently through time on a variety of issues, the pluralistic community becomes factional. It would be interesting to watch some of the communities in which some of the alignments were maintained to see if they move in the direction of factional communities. A major feature of the pluralistic community is that the interest groups do not align themselves consistently across issues and therefore the ability of a group of interest groups to agree on a sufficient number of issues to dominate or to have their own faction represented is grounds for us to hypothesize that these communities will move toward, in the first case, dominated communities, and in the second case, factional ones.

In summary then, the hypothesis that the pluralistic power structure would more often be followed by a status congruent board was confirmed, with 18 of 23 such communities having the classifications that indicated the association.

4. Inert Structure

The fourth hypothesis was that the inert community power structure would more often be associated with a sanctioning school board. Underlying this hypothesis is the reasoning that the only way in which a superintendent can have a school board which rubber-stamps his decisions is for the power structure in the community to be inert. We have already discovered this reasoning is wrong in the sense that the statement is too strong. In one dominated community, the superintendent was the representative of the dominated power structure on the school board, and the school board became simply a formally legitimizing structure.

In the general case, this hypothesis was confirmed (see Table 5). The second most frequent community power structure found in the study was the inert, and of the 13 such communities, 8 had sanctioning school boards. In general, this type of arrangement allows the maximum decision-making ability on the part of the superintendent; he is operating in a vacuum of power. The absence of exercised power in a community, however, and the absence of disagreement on the school board, must both be present.

Presumably, if the community power structure is inert, the school board is permitted to relate to the superintendent and to the community in any manner it desires. In such an inert community, it was found that the superintendent often suggests candidates for the school board. However, in some communities the pattern of apathy and reluctant candidacy did not seem to be the case. In three communities, very interested individuals ran for the school board, and operated much in the way the legal spirit of the law indicates they should operate. In other words, without the support of small interest groups as would be the case in the pluralistic community, these board members filled in the vacuum of interest and power and operated as a debating society on school issues, using as a criteria those ends which they felt the school board should have. These status congruent boards, with an inert or latent power structure behind them, must be explained in psycho-social terms. The interest of the board members in school issues appears to be the major factor in making the deviation in the pattern which was expected, namely, inert community and sanctioning board. Of course, once this pattern of relationships is established in the board, then even apathetic school board members as they come into this social arena will be influenced by the other members of the board and by the established pattern of activity and interest.

In summary, then, the hypothesis that inert power structures would be more often associated with sanctioning boards was confirmed, with 8 of 13 such cases following the expected pattern.

In summarizing the relationship between the community power structure and the structure of the school board, it is important to note that a diagonal was theoretically expected on the basis of the model. In Table 5, the dominated community power structure was expected to be followed by a dominated board, a factional power structure by a factional board, and so on.

In Table 5, the correlation between community power structure and the structure of the school board appears to be unusually high if one uses as the standard of comparison the correlations usually found in social data. The 51 communities included in the present study were classified in such a way that almost three-fourths of them followed the pattern predicted by the model. Thirty-seven of the 51 communities were classified in the diagonals expected from the model. Of course the extent to which judgments classifying the community power structure and that of the school board could be expected to be independent of each other is problematical, as was indicated in the chapter on methodological problems. However, there was an effort to make these judgments separate, and the fact that approximately one fourth, 14 communities, did not fit the expected direction gives us some confidence in indicating that the model is worthy of much further analysis.

The correlation using the phi coefficient described in the chapter on methodology resulted in a correlation of .54. This phi is not capable of being squared, and cannot therefore be interpreted in the standard comparison which is often made commensurate with product moment correlation. Nevertheless, the correlation of .54 in the general frame of reference of correlations is moderately high for zero order correlations.

The chi square test of significance is the one recommended for testing the significance of the phi coefficient. It is especially appropriate in the present data because not only are the classes in the table not quantitative, but the effort here is not in the direction of searching for parameters. Chi square is a non-parametric sampling statistic. Even with the few number of cases involved in the present study, the probability level of acceptance was .001.

As mentioned earlier, it is important to note throughout that the appearance of precision may be suggested by the use of correlations, and at this stage in the development of the theory of power it would probably be better to depend upon the general idea that the model seems to take care of more than a numerical majority of the cases in which the community power structure is expected to correlate with a particular type of structure for the school board.

B. The School Board and the Role of Superintendent

The highest relationship would be expected between the structure of the school board and the role of the superintendent. Although the general focus of this study is on the informal power structure, the reasoning behind the expectation that the structure of the school board and the role of the superintendent will be more highly correlated than other features of the model is based on the fact that the informal power operations of the school board are legitimized through their actual legal authority over the superintendent. Regardless of the real reasons the superintendent is asked to resign, the actual request for resignation, or the legitimation of factors which would cause a superintendent to wish to resign must come from the school board itself. In other words, the school board is legally, officially, as well as informally, the boss of the superintendent.

1. Dominated Board

The fifth hypothesis of the study, and the first one positing a correlation between the structure of the board and the role of the superintendent, stated: The dominated school board will more often be followed by the role of functionary being played by the superintendent.

This hypothesis was confirmed in the present data, with 6 of the 8 dominated school boards having a superintendent who was judged by the judging teams to be playing the functionary role (see Table 6). The sensitivity of superintendents to the power and authority situation in their school districts is a well-known fact. The superintendency is often humorously referred to as the "uneasy" profession. It, therefore, seems likely that the role of functionary is a syndrome of behavior patterns which the superintendent senses is necessary if the board is reflecting a domination within the community.

Another factor probably operates to bring about the confirmation of the hypothesis. One intent of the model was to test whether mixtures of roles, structures of boards, and structures of power

TABLE 6

RELATIONSHIP OF TYPE OF SCHOOL BOARD AND ROLE OF SUPERINTENDENT

	Role of Superintendent				
Structure of School Board	Functionary	Political Strategist	Professional Advisor	Decision Maker	Total
Dominated	6	0	2	0	8
Factional	1	6	3	0	10
Status Congruent	1	3	16	2	22
Sanctioning	0	0	0	11	11
Total	8	9	21	13	51

Chi Square = 76.89
$P < .001$
Phi = .71

in the community would result in the superintendent being asked to resign. This would bring about a selective factor operating in the present study, provided the model is correct to begin with. That is to say, the requirement that a superintendent must have been in that school district for two years for the district to be included in the present sample would, to the extent that the model is correct, select out those mixtures of role and board structure which would deviate from the expected pattern.

The two exceptions to hypothesis five were cases which were not, in fact, mixtures. The dominated school board in some communities would appreciate a professional adviser as much as a functionary, to the extent that the advisor does not make intensive efforts to change school policy himself. Both of the exceptions from the dominated communities were cases in which the board was dominated but the superintendent played the role of professional advisor. There are some characteristics which the functionary and the professional advisor have in common. Perhaps the most important is that of "playing it cool". The calm and unobtrusive approach to school matters is a result of a quite different set of dynamics in the case of the functionary than of the advisor, but it nevertheless is one which can be tolerated by the dominated school board regardless of the underlying motives and intents.

2. Factional Board

The sixth hypothesis stated that the factional school board would more often be associated with the role of political strategist being played by the superintendent. The reasoning behind this hypothesis was that, first, the superintendent must cooperate with the majority of the factional board or he cannot accomplish anything in school policy making and implementation. Second, in cooperating with the majority the superintendent must not become identified as being "their boy". The reason for this is that often in a truly factional community, the factions are about equal in power. This year's minority may become next year's majority. To the extent that the factionalism is based upon conflict, the superintendent who becomes identified as a full-fledged member of the opposed faction would be asked to resign by the new majority. It could be concluded that the superintendent, in order to succeed, must participate in considerable political strategy with both the majority and minority in order to survive changes in the political situation within the community.

In general, the hypothesis that the factional school board is more often associated with the political strategist role for the superintendent was confirmed (see Table 6). Six of the 10 cases of factional school boards were classified as having a political strategist as a superintendent. These superintendents were characterized as depending very heavily on committees, and very large committees at that. In one factional community, the superintendent would have committees of as many as 100 citizens; and if two alternatives were suggested, he would have two committees, each of one hundred citizens. The school board members were burdened down with factual reports coming from the work of these committees, and were constantly behind the superintendent in information. This kept the factions off balance with regard to their relationship with the superintendent, although they still were able to fight each other on policy matters. The backlog of literature which the board members had and had not been able to read was, as a matter of actual measurement, 18 inches high.

Another aspect of the political strategist is reflected in the methodology of this study. In designing the model for testing, it was felt that the political strategist would, in his public speeches, arouse a great deal of adrenalin on motherhood, liberty, and sound school policy. When it came, however, to issues such as tax rates and integration, indefiniteness would be the main characteristic of his speech. The interviews were the same. The political strategists were extremely vague and non-committal on school policy, board structure, power structure of the community, and practically every issue that was brought to their attention.

The absence of one exception is itself noteworthy. There were no decision makers among the superintendents in factional communities. As long as a majority faction maintains its control, it can tolerate a functionary, and only when the majority changes will the functionary run into trouble. Furthermore, a professional advisor can operate in a factional community, provided he maintains some loopholes through which to retreat in case his professional training and professional understandings differ with either the minority or the majority. Indeed, there were three professional advisors in communities whose school boards were classified as factional.

3. Status Congruent Board

The seventh hypothesis stated that the status congruent school board would more often be associated with the role of professional advisor being played by the superintendent. The reasoning behind this is that the nature of the status congruent school board is one of giving respect to colleagues on the basis of the worth of their statements, the depth of their understanding, and the amount of information they seem to have. Such a frame of reference operating socially in the school board would clearly generalize to the role of the superintendent himself. Therefore, the status congruent board would wish the person who was expected to have the greatest depth of understanding and the most information about the schools to present recommendations and alternatives based upon these kinds of professional criteria. On the other hand, the status congruent board presumably would understand and feel obliged to carry through on its legal responsibility of decision making at the policy level. Therefore, the professional advisor would be simply that, an advisor.

The hypothesis that the status congruent school board would be more often followed by the role of professional advisor being played by the superintendent was confirmed (see Table 6). Sixteen of the 22 status congruent boards were associated with superintendents who played the role of professional advisor. The exceptions were scattered through the other three classes of roles. There was one functionary, three political strategists, and two decision makers.

Presumably, the status congruent school board could tolerate any of the four roles as long as they were not played intensively. Even the decision maker could be tolerated so long as he did not preempt the most crucial policy decisions from the status congruent board.

The original work on this model posited the first two types of school boards and roles for the superintendent. All other school boards were classified as rational, which in the process of developing the model became the status congruent board. However, in the development of the model the term rational, while too strong for the social structure of the board itself, does indicate the nature of toleration of exceptions. As one board member put it, "He (the superintendent) is a little bit compulsive. However, when he makes a move that really should be in the hands of the board, we simply tell him that we are going to decide this ourselves. Sometimes it gets into a matter of reversing his decision, which is about as embarrassing a thing to him as can happen."

4. Sanctioning Board

The eighth hypothesis states that the sanctioning board will be associated with the role of decision maker being played by the superintendent. The reasoning behind this is that the only situation in the community or school board which can allow a superintendent really to set policy is the situation in which there is a vacuum of power, or that the power is not directed at issues of education through the school board.

There is another factor that operates in some communities. In situations in which there is some inclination for the citizenry to be apathetic, a very strong personality may emerge in the role of superintendent, and because he is able to take the responsibility and please the citizens generally with respect to his decisions, he is able to become the decision maker almost on his own initiative. We would contend that this could not happen in either a dominated or a factional community, especially if there were a correspondence between the community power structure and the structure of the board. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is best expressed by a school board member, a very bright, well educated, and interested citizen: "Well Mr. X knows his stuff, he knows this community, and why should we bother to reverse his decisions."

The eighth hypothesis, that the sanctioning board is more often associated with the decision maker role being played by the superintendent, was confirmed (see Table 6). All 11 of the sanctioning boards were associated with the decision maker role. The uniformity of the findings brings even more serious questions to the methodology, and perhaps some explication would be helpful at this point.

One possibility is that when a decision maker was found and the judging teams could clearly classify the superintendent as playing this role, it let the halo effect transfer to a board and thereby classified it as sanctioning when possibly it may not have been. Actually, this hypothesis is reasonable, except that in two communities decision makers were classified by the judging team in which the school boards were classified as status congruent. These two exceptions suggest that the team was honestly looking for interested and active board members, although they may well have missed some communities in this regard.

A second possibility may be suggested. In some communities we found good evidence that the decision maker superintendent often made suggestions about the acceptability of certain candidates for board membership. If the superintendent were self-consciously a decision maker, he would likely pick board members who would not give him much trouble in making policy decisions. Since these decision makers are often men of long tenure in the same school district, the time should come when either they have almost complete control of educational policy in the community or have been asked to resign, for a decision maker is the most difficult role for the other three board types (other than sanctioning) to tolerate.

The summary of the data on which these previous four hypotheses have been confirmed are presented in Table 6. The diagonals which were predicted by the model are clearly the cells most frequented by classifications made by the judging teams. There is less scatter than found in the previous table in which the correlation between the community power structure and the structure of the school board was tested.

As expected in the model, the correlation between the structure of the school board and the role of the superintendent was the highest found in the study. The phi coefficient was computed and resulted in a correlation of .71. Again, chi square was used as a test of significance and the probability of this being due to chance was at the .001 level. This correlation, while it must be viewed in very tentative terms, is unusually high for social data.

C. Community Power and Role of the Superintendent

The correlation between the community power structure and the role of the superintendent is expected to be lower than that of either of the other two associations. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, the community more often expresses its control over its superintendent through the school board, although this is not exclusively the case. Secondly, there is more room for the power of the community to be contested or at least to fail to be expressed in school decision making when there is an intermediary role, namely that of the board member. In other words, the social distance is greater and the room for error in implementing power is greater.

On the other hand, there is some direct control of power figures in the community over the superintendent. This is expressed, as we found in the study, through personal associations, through the luncheon club, and through the desire of the superintendent sometimes to preempt the legal functioning of the board to protect himself. Furthermore, the correlations between the community structure and the structure of the board, as well as that between the structure of the board and the role of the superintendent, should produce some correlation between the community power structure and the role of the superintendent simply by deduction.

1. Dominated-Functionary

The ninth hypothesis stated that the dominated community power structure would more often be associated with the functionary role of superintendent. For the first time, less than a majority of the cases corresponded to the expected pattern on the basis of the model (see Table 7). Only 3 or 8 cases followed this hypothesis, while 5 superintendents in dominated communities played roles other than that expected on the basis of the model. This brings to question the vagueness of the hypothesis which we set about to study. What does the term "more often associated with"

TABLE 7

RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE TO ROLE OF SUPERINTENDENT

	Superintendent Role				
Community Structure	1 Functionary	2 Political Strategist	3 Professional Advisor	4 Decision Maker	Total
1 Dominated	3	1	2	2	8
2 Factual	0	4	2	1	7
3 Pluralistic	4	3	14	2	23
4 Inert	1	1	3	8	13
Total	8	9	21	13	51

mean? Do we mean a numerical majority, or do we mean simply that this would be the most frequent association? If the most frequent association is the interpretation, then the hypothesis is confirmed. However, the model indicates that there should be a numerical majority of cases which follow the expected pattern, and in this case we could not say that the hypothesis is confirmed.

Two of the exceptions would lead us to further exploration of this association in future research. One of the exceptions is that found in two communities in which the superintendent played the role of professional adviser. It is entirely possible that the dominated community, under certain circumstances, would prefer a professional advisor. One such community was a clearly dominated community in which the dominators were high level managers of a national company. These persons were of the new managerial class in companies with national posture, and they were clearly accustomed to delegating authority. They expected their employees, in their plans or in their school, to be professional and to make recommendations. Further, it was assumed that policy makers would use these recommendations as a basis for making their decisions.

The second exception which seems to make sense in terms of the general approach of the model is that found when the community is so dominated it is inert, as one of the interviewers put it. The community power structure feels very safe and secure that its policies will never be confronted. Therefore, it does not deal directly with school boards but rather assures itself that a superintendent who agrees with its philosophy is employed. This superintendent then operates as a decision maker, as was found in two communities. All of the data, all of the criteria of judgment, and all of the other factors involved in making a judgment would have clearly classified this superintendent as a decision maker, as will be seen in the upper right hand cell of Table 7. When, however, one looks at the philosophy of the superintendents who were classified in this cell, and views the extreme domination found in the community power system, one can readily see how the exception is more than a mixture of unfortunate circumstances. Rather, it is again a necessary condition to making the model exhaustive of conditions under which the superintendent can be expected to play a role satisfactory to those employing him.

2. Factional-Strategist

The tenth hypothesis stated that the factional community would more often be associated with the role of political strategist being played by the superintendent. This hypothesis was confirmed, with four of the seven factional communities having political strategists as superintendents (see Table 7). The reasoning behind this relationship has already been discussed in the section on the relationship of the school board and the role of the superintendent.

The exceptions were noteworthy in at least the sense that two of the superintendents who did not play the role of political strategist performed again the most tolerable role when mixtures occur, namely that of professional advisor. The superintendent who played the role of the decision maker in a factional community was an interesting case. The community was clearly factional, but the factions had not yet turned their attention to school matters. One of the factions controlled the school board, with the other faction turning its energy to matters other than school policy. The school board was made up of persons who were not directly involved in the factional disputes, although they were supported by one of the factions indirectly. They were largely people who would not cause either faction any trouble, because they were not activists. Therefore, they assumed the posture of the sanctioning board and, in a sense, permitted the superintendent to play the role of decision maker. He was very careful not to bring up issues which were central to any controversies between the factions; in this way he could play the role of decision maker in all other issues of school policy.

3. Pluralism-Professional Advisor

The eleventh hypothesis stated that the pluralistic community would more often be associated with the role of a professional advisor being played by the superintendent. This hypothesis was confirmed. Fourteen of the 23 communities which were classified as pluralistic had superintendents who played the role of professional advisor (see Table 7).

As in the case of the other tables with other associations being tested, this particular pattern of the model could tolerate the greatest amount of scatter. It was found earlier that the status congruent board, associated with the pluralistic community, could tolerate to some extent all roles for the superintendent. The present table indicates that similarly the pluralistic community can tolerate any type of superintendent. There was some indication that the superintendents who were in the decision-making role did not play their role as intensively as they might have in an inert community, but even so, there were four superintendents in pluralistic communities who played the role of functionary to certain interest groups, there were three who played the role of political strategist unnecessarily, and two who played the role to some extent of decision maker.

4. Inert-Decision Maker

The twelfth and last hypothesis suggesting a specific relationship within the model states that the inert power structure will more often be associated with the role of decision maker being played by the superintendent. This hypothesis again was confirmed with 8 of the 13 communities which were classified as having inert or latent power structures also having superintendents who played the role of decision maker (see Table 7). The exceptions were primarily that of a professional adviser being in a community in which the power structure itself was inert, but in which the school board was not sanctioning but rather more active than the power structure behind it. The higher correlation between the structure of the board and the role of the superintendent seems to be a factor throughout. Especially in the case of the inert community a superintendent might remain in the community for more than two years when his role does not match that of the community power structure as suggested by the model.

In summary, the correlation between the community structure and the role of the superintendent was the lowest of the three basic correlations. The significance level, using chi square, was .005. In general, the correlations found here are unusually high, but must be modified because of the limitations of the method of using judges, and the possibility of having a halo effect operate.

The correlations are relatively high in the analysis just completed if compared with the usual findings of zero order correlations with social date. However, only 28 of the 51 communities fit the model in all regards (see Table 8).

TABLE 8

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CASES AND MODEL

Community Power Structure	Structure of the School Board	Role of the Superintendent	Number with "Perfect Fit"
Dominated	Dominated	Functionary	3
Factional	Factional	Political Strategist	4
Pluralistic	Status Congruent	Professional Advisor	13
Inert	Sanctioning	Decision Maker	8
		Total with "Perfect Fit" ..	28
	Agree only on Community and Board		9
	Agree only on Board and Superintendent		11
	Agree only on Community and Superintendent ..		1
	All three mixed classes		2
		Accumulated Total	51

D. Ecological Correlates of Power Variation

1. Size and Type of Community

On the basis of the experience of the researchers and on the basis of previous literature, it was expected that the inert power structure would be primarily characteristic of the small rural community. The greater number of people in the community increases greatly the probability that there will be leaders who will organize groups who are interested in the schools. Furthermore, the small town in a mass society has become increasingly incapable of fighting battles with state offices of education, and with other mass variables which influence the schools. It was further thought that the pluralistic community would be primarily characteristic of suburban areas with relatively new residents and new housing. The lack of any basis for domination or even for factionalism in many of these suburban communities would lead one to the conclusion that the first two types, dominated and factional, would be rare in the suburban community. It was further thought that the educational level and heavy proportion of parents in these suburban communities would create enough interest to avoid the inert power structure that we thought would be characteristic of the rural community. In looking around the country, the well-known factional communities are almost all large cities, probably partly because city school problems are better publicized. On the basis of our experience and previous studies, then, we felt that the factional situation would be characteristic of the large urban center more than of other types of residential arrangements. Similarly, Hunter's classic work in Atlanta, Georgia, indicated that there would be some large urban centers in which there would be a dominated power structure. No hypothesis could be suggested for the small urban center, although there is a basis for power domination in small industry, banks, and the like.

In large part the expectations were confirmed. In Table 9 the findings are presented. The relationship is highly significant and the phi coefficient is .498. In this table it will be seen that about two-thirds of the rural communities were classified as having an inert power structure, thus confirming the expectation. Similarly, the suburban communities were classified as expected, with 7 of the 10 suburban communities being pluralistic in the power relationships.

TABLE 9

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POWER STRUCTURE AND SIZE AND TYPE OF COMMUNITY CENTER

	Community Center					
Community Power Structure	Large Urban	Small Urban	Suburban	Rural	Total	Percent
Dominated	0	5	1	2	8	.157
Factional	5	1	1	0	7	.137
Pluralistic	6	7	7	3	23	.451
Inert	0	1	1	11	13	.255
Total	11	14	10	16	51	1.000

Chi square=37.89
$P < .001$
Phi=.498

The large urban centers followed the expected pattern in one way but not in another. Approximately half of the eleven large urban centers were factional as expected. However, the other half were pluralistic rather than dominated as was expected on the basis of the literature. Two cases of large urban centers had clearly been in transition from dominated to pluralistic, but had moved far enough that the judging team classified them as pluralistic. It is possible that the domination of a very large city is much more difficult in this day and age when minority interests have been given consideration in law, programs, and by public as well as private agencies, and when the ideology of minority rights has been so widely publicized.

Small urban centers, ranging in size from 2500 to just under 25,000, were somewhat more often pluralistic than other types of power arrangements, with the majority of the remaining communities being dominated. This would seem to square with the previous hypothesis that in the urban setting we find a better basis for power domination but in the large urban center such domination is difficult because of the vocal minority interests that are so widespread in the large urban center.

In general, however, there was a moderate relationship between the size and type of community center in the school district and the type of community power structure found, with most of the types of power associated with various size and type arrangements in the community center living up to expectations.

Since the model posits a perfect correlation between community power structure and community school board, the same reasoning was used in hypothesizing the type of school board structure which would appear in each of the four types of living arrangements described in Table 10.

In general, the expectations were again consistent with the findings. In the rural community, we find that still over half of the school boards are sanctioning, consistent with the concentration of inert power structures in rural communities, but the relationship was not quite so high as in the case of the power structure. There was a concentration of 9 of the 16 school boards in rural communities in the classification of sanctioning, but there were 5 status congruent boards found in such communities.

TABLE 10

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TYPE OF SCHOOL BOARD AND SIZE AND TYPE OF COMMUNITY CENTER

School Board Structure	Large Urban	Small Urban	Suburban	Rural	Total	Percent
	Community Center					
Dominated	1	4	1	2	8	.157
Factional	7	3	0	0	10	.196
Status congruent	3	7	7	5	22	.431
Sanctioning	0	0	2	9	11	.217
Total	11	14	10	16	51	1.001

Chi square=35.27
$P < .001$
Phi=.481

As in the case of the relationship between ecological and demographic arrangement with the power structure, we found that 7 of the 10 suburban school boards were status congruent, consistent both with the previous finding and with the expectations.

The association of factional school boards with the large urban centers, which was posited but only partly found for the community power structure, was higher for the school boards. Seven of the eleven school boards in large urban centers were in the factional area, with only three in the status congruent classification. As in the case of the relationship between power and size, the small urban centers were spread over the first three categories, with 7 of the 14 being classified as status congruent, 4 as dominated, and 3 as factional. The probability was high and the phi coefficient was moderate with phi equal to .481.

2. The Availability of Resources -- Median Income

Median income is one of the best measures of the tax base and other types of resources which are available for the development of good schools. The expectation was that in the higher income communities there would be a tendency for pluralistic and dominated power structures to exist. The reasoning behind this was that in some high income areas there is a true basis of power which has been found in previous studies to be wealth and the holding of credit. This type of high income would lead to domination. In other types of high income communities we find the suburban community, thus combining the hypothesis in this table with that in the previous tables. In the suburban high income area, or in a community which was a bedroom community for people with more money, there would be much more interest in the schools than in inert communities but less alignment in large factions.

In the lowest income communities, it was expected that most of the power would be inert because of the lack of local funds for matching or contesting state policy carried through the superintendent. In addition, a large portion of the population would have to search out a living and thus would have little time for active participation in community affairs related to the school. It was, therefore, expected that factional and to some extent dominated communities would appear more often in the other two average groups which represent the two middle columns in Table 11.

TABLE 11

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AND MEDIAN INCOME

Community Power Structure	Median Income $7,000 and above	$6,000-6,999	$5,000-5,999	Below $5,000	Total	Percent
Dominated	2	1	4	1	8	.157
Factional	2	4	0	1	7	.137
Pluralistic	7	6	6	4	23	.451
Inert	0	2	3	8	13	.255
Total	11	13	13	14	51	1.000

Chi square=18.79
$P < .05$
Phi=.351

In general, the findings with respect to the high income areas were correct for pluralistic but not for dominated power structures. Only 2 of the 11 high income communities were dominated, and 2 of these high income areas were also factional However, 7 were pluralistic. The expectation that there would be more activity than would lead to an inert power structure was confirmed.

The expectation that most of the communities low in median income would be in the inert power structure was also confirmed, although out of the total of 14 there were 4 low income communities which were pluralistic. But, as stated before, in both the high and the low income communities the findings in general confirm the expectations with the exception that few dominated communities are in the high income area.

The spread of communities in the middle income categories was not so great as was expected. Clearly, as one moves from the low average to the high average, we would expect the findings to match more closely the expectations of the very high income communities. This was not so. Only one of the communities whose median income was from $6,000 to $6,999 was in the dominated category, while this seemed to be the category in which over half of the factional communities was concentrated. An even greater concentration was found for pluralistic communities. The same was true for pluralistic communities in the low average category with almost half of such communities being classified as pluralistic.

In general the relationship between the community power structure and the median income in the community is low to moderate, with the two main findings being that in the very low income group we find a concentration of inert power structures and in the very high income communities we find a concentration of pluralistic communities.

In Table 12 are presented the findings with respect to the relationship between median income and board structure. Again, the assumption in the model is that the findings would follow the expectations for power structures themselves.

TABLE 12

MEDIAN INCOME

School Board Structure	$7,000 and above	$6,000-6,999	$5,000-5,999	Below $5,000	Total	Percent
Dominated	1	1	5	1	8	.157
Factional	3	3	2	2	10	.196
Status congruent	7	5	4	6	22	.431
Sanctioning	0	4	2	5	11	.217
Total	11	13	13	14	51	1.001

Chi square=12.44
$P \nless .05$
Phi=.37

As in the case of power structures, our expectation that about half of the very high income communities would be dominated was not confirmed, with only 1 of 11 such communities being so classified. The expectation that status congruent communities would be found in this very high income level was apparent, but the over-all significance of the table was not sufficiently high to warrant more than a most tentative conclusion.

In general, then, the relationships that were expected in correlating median income of a community with the power structure and with the board structure were not borne out by the data. However, there was a low to moderate relationship between the power structure and median income. Striking results are that in the cases of the community power structure we find the concentration of pluralistic power in the very high group and a concentration of inert power in the very low group.

3. Home Resources -- Level of Living

Like income, level of living reflects the economic resources of the community available to implement policy in schools, especially with respect to high tax expenditure items for buildings. The level of living of the home, however, is a competing factor, thus being defined somewhat differently from individual to individual. It is an important aspect of consideration for the schools because in most states the tax which goes locally to the school is based upon property.

The expectations, however, were the same as those posited between median income and power structure.

There are many indices of level of living found in the census and in other available sources. However, in collecting the data on such things as washing machines, television sets, and the like we discovered that the variation was either extremely small or there was not a good correlation between this one item and level of living that was known to exist in the communities we studied. For example, we found that at the lower levels of income the percentage of families who owned a washing machine was fairly consistent with known level of living in the community. In the wealthy communities which we studied there were many fewer families who owned a washing machine, presumably because laundries were sent out. Therefore, we decided to limit the analysis of level of living to that which is most closely correspondent to the base on which tax assessments are made. In the available statistics this turned out to be the percentage of houses which were sound buildings and which had all plumbing facilities available. The range was quite wide.

The expectations were in no way confirmed in either Table 13 or Table 14. Although there did appear to be certain concentrations of frequencies in expected directions in the case of the relationship between the community power structure and the percentage of houses which were sound, the correlation was not significant at usual levels of acceptance. The correlation appeared to be even lower in the case of school boards, and, therefore, we can draw no

TABLE 13

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AND PERCENT OF SOUND BUILDINGS WITH ALL PLUMBING FACILITIES

	Percent of Sound Buildings and Plumbing Facilities				
Community Power Structure	80% or more	70%-79.9%	60%-69.9%	Less than 60%	Total
Dominated	4	1	2	1	8
Factional	4	2	1	0	7
Pluralistic	13	4	5	1	23
Inert	2	3	2	6	13
Total	23	10	10	8	51

Chi square=15.21

conclusions other than that there is no significant relationship between the percentage of sound buildings with all plumbing facilities and either power structure or the school board.

TABLE 14

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF SCHOOL BOARD AND PERCENT OF SOUND BUILDINGS WITH ALL PLUMBING FACILITIES

School Board Structure	Percent of Sound Buildings and Plumbing Facilities				
	80% or more	70%-79.9%	60%-69.9%	Less than 60%	Total
Dominated	3	1	3	1	8
Factional	5	3	1	1	10
Status congruent	11	3	5	3	22
Sanctioning	4	3	1	3	11
Total	23	10	10	8	51

Chi square=5.6

4. The Measurement of Burden -- The Percent of the Population Under 21

The number of youth to be educated in relation to the total population is a factor which varies considerably from one community to another. The burden on the adult population to sponsor good schools is much greater when this proportion is higher in relation to the number of people in the labor force. We test this correlation in Table 15 and Table 16.

TABLE 15

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AND PERCENT OF POPULATION UNDER 21

Community Power Structure	Percent Under 21				
	45 and above	40 - 44.9	35 - 39.9	Below 35	Total
Dominated	0	3	4	1	8
Factional	2	2	3	0	7
Pluralistic	3	6	9	5	23
Inert	0	9	4	0	13
Total	5	20	20	6	51

Chi square=13.82

TABLE 16

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF SCHOOL BOARD AND PERCENT OF POPULATION UNDER 21

School Board Structure	Percent Under 21				
	45 and above	40 - 44.9	35 - 39.9	Below 35	Total
Dominated	1	4	1	2	8
Factional	2	2	6	0	10
Status congruent	2	6	10	4	22
Sanctioning	0	8	3	0	11
Total	5	20	20	6	51

Chi square=14.89

The expectations were that there would be very little factionalism in places in which the burden was higher, because of the overwhelming necessity of getting the children educated. It was further expected that when the burden was greater, there would be a concentration of pluralistic power and of school boards of a status congruent nature.

None of the expectations was confirmed, and the correlations were not significant at the usual level of acceptance. Neither in the case of the community power structure nor in the case of the structure of the school board was there any notable concentration of types with respect to burden as measured by the percentage of the population under 21.

5. Age and Conservatism -- The Percentage of the Population Over 65

We often find a positive correlation between conservatism and age. We also often find that the associations of taxpayers who oppose school bond issues and the like are composed of members who are older and who have no children in school. Such an arrangement immediately leads one to the notion that when there is a large group of persons over 65, assuming of course that there are also numbers of parents in the community, that there would be factionalism in such communities. Similarly, we would find that when the percentage of persons over 65 is extremely small, there would be a much smoother running power structure. Similar relationships would be hypothesized for the school board.

The correlations between the percentage of persons in the central community over 65 and the community power structure are shown in Table 17 and those between the percentage over 65 and the school board structure in Table 18. In neither case were the expectations confirmed. This ecological factor showed little relationship to the type of community power structure or to the type of school board present in the community. Both correlations were below the usual level of acceptance.

TABLE 17

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AND PERCENT OF POPULATION OVER 65

Community Power Structure	Percent Over 65 13% or over	11.0%-12.9%	9% - 10.9%	Below 9%	Total
Dominated	1	2	5	0	8
Factional	0	1	5	1	7
Pluralistic	3	7	7	6	23
Inert	4	5	4	0	13
Total	8	15	21	7	51

Chi square=12.97

6. Previous Commitment to Education -- The Percentage of the Adult Population Who Completed High School

The percentage who complete high school ranges greatly in the United States, with some communities having more than half of their

TABLE 18

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF SCHOOL BOARD AND PERCENT OF POPULATION OVER 65

School Board Structure	Percent Over 65 13% or over	 11.0%-12.9%	 9% - 10.9%	 Below 9%	 Total
Dominated	1	3	4	0	8
Factional	1	2	5	2	10
Status congruent	4	6	7	5	22
Sanctioning	2	4	5	0	11
Total	8	15	21	7	51

Chi square=6.06

population receiving the high school degree and other communities having less than a fourth who have completed such work. The expectation was that previous commitment to education would result in a much higher interest in the schools, thus diverting these highly educated communities away from inert power structures. Generally, to the extent that the percent who complete high school is not a function of other factors, we would expect the communities in which there is a higher completion rate to be pluralistic. On the other end of the continuum, we would expect that the concentration of the communities with very little educational attainment on the average to be spread in other than pluralistic types of power structures with respect to school issues. It would be easier to dominate a community in which the citizenry had indicated little previous commitment to education, and it would also allow a superintendent to dominate a school board or a community citizenry thus making the power structure inert.

TABLE 19

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE AND PERCENT OF THE ADULT POPULATION WHO HAD COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL

	Completed High School				
Community Power Structure	50% or more	40% - 49.9%	30% - 39.9%	20% - 29.9%	Total
Dominated	1	3	4	0	8
Factional	1	4	2	0	7
Pluralistic	7	10	6	0	23
Inert	0	5	3	5	13
Total	9	22	15	5	51

Chi square=21.06
$P < .02$
Phi=.37

In Table 19 we find that these expectations are confirmed for the most part. Seven of the 9 communities in which there were more than 50 percent of the adult population who had finished high school were pluralistic in nature. The expectation that many of the lower groups would be found in the inert classification was confirmed, with all five of the lowest communities so classified. However, the expectation that dominated communities would also be found in this low group was not confirmed. In fact, the dominated communities were about evenly divided between the two middle groups in high school achievement. The phi coefficient was low to moderate.

TABLE 20

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE OF SCHOOL BOARD AND PERCENT OF THE ADULT POPULATION WHO HAD COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL

School Board Structure	Completed High School 50% or more	40% - 49.9%	30% - 39.9%	20% - 29.9%	Total
Dominated	1	2	5	0	8
Factional	1	5	4	0	10
Status Congruent	7	8	5	2	22
Sanctioning	0	7	1	3	11
Total	9	22	15	5	51

Chi square=17.25
$P < .05$
Phi=.336

The expectations for the relationship between previous commitment to education and school board structure were identical to those in the case of the community power structure. Again, the confirmation on the very highly educated communities was found, with 7 of the 9 communities being classified as status congruent (see Table 20). The very low educated communities were evenly split between status congruent and inert, warranting further investigation. As in the case of the previous relationship, there was no tendency for dominated communities to be found in the very low group; however, dominated communities were found much more often in the low average than in the high average or high group. In all cases, the factional communities were primarily concentrated in the low average and high average group with respect to previous commitment to education.

In general we find that the highest relationship of any ecological factor to either the power structure or to the school board structure is that of the type of community. This relationship mainly followed expectations and was thought to be important enough to use as the basis for stratifying the sample at the beginning of the study.

The other factor which was related to power structure and school board structure was the percent of persons in the community who had completed high school. Median income was related to the community power structure. No significant correlations were found between the central variables of this study and the soundness of the building of homes, the burden as represented by the percent of the population under 21, or the conservatism as measured by the percent of the population over 65.

E. Case Studies of Patterns Consistent with the Model

1. The Typical Dominated Community

The community selected for the typical dominated community is a medium size city. This city has four banks, one of which is relatively small and unimportant in assessing the power structure, and several industries, three of which are local plants for nationwide industries of some size. The city is about medium in level of living, and most of the persons "on the hill" are of above average to high income. Down in "the flats" there are some minority groups and some whites who are of fairly low income, although there is no extreme poverty. Some issues have arisen in the community over the provision of technical and mechanical education, with the kinds of education often thought of as most appropriate for low income children in large part being neglected.

There is an honest effort to get a Negro on the school board at each election, but the Negro who served by far the longest was a Negro physician who was a well-known surgeon in the region. In fact, his reputation was such that he was the observer in more cases of surgery than any other physician in town. Although he had an opportunity to develop a white clientele among the upper middle-class because of his knowledge and skill, he preferred to work with the poor down on the flats. At one point in the history of this community this physician decided that he would not be able to run for the school board any more. The nominating committee for the school board discovered that it could not "find leadership" among the poor in the flats, because it could not find someone who would not be upsetting to the smooth operations of the school board. They finally settled upon a quiet business man whose customers were primarily minority group members but who himself was white. He was neither highly respected nor looked down upon by the minority group members, and in discussions with a few of the minority group members we discovered that he was not considered to be their representative.

The school board was made up of seven members, and for most of the history of this community the decision-making process ran smoothly. Aside from the representative from the flats, there were several professors, several real estate men, some businessmen, and a few women who participated in community affairs but who were the wives of people who did not "rock the boat". For the most part, we could not determine that many of these people were high in the power structure, but neither were they potential trouble makers.

Social conditions existed which could make for factionalism in the community. Labor unions were not strong, but there was a reasonably heavy portion of the electorate who were Catholics, and there was also a medium sized college in town. The elections for mayor and city coundil swung back and forth between Democratic and Republican. However, the labor management basis for conflict, the town and gown basis, and the Democratic-Republican basis did not appear to operate. The professors were heavily committed to their research programs, the Republicans and Democrats cooperated at a high level, and the Catholics and labor unions were relatively inert.

The superintendent was a person who had published research and other articles in education. He appeared to be a decision maker. His recommendations were based on professional criteria, and since the board members were interested in good schools and respectful of expertise, they did not oppose him. This community probably would have been classified as inert, with a sanctioning board, and a decision maker superintendent if it had not been for one event which illustrated a kind of domination that could come into play at any given time.

The event giving rise to this classification of the community occurred when some of the less satisfied members of the board were joined by two persons who were dissatisfied with both school policy and the method of operation of the superintendent. Usually the superintendent had placed his case on the basis of "what's in it for you." The superintendent was not a student in this regard, or in other regards, as will become clear later. Since he was in the power structure itself at a fairly low echelon, he should simply have followed the role of the trusted servant with professional understanding when discussing matters with the board.

It is significant that the members of the board who rocked the boat in this situation had not campaigned on the particular issues which came under discussion. Rather, their respect in the community and their quiet personal nature led people to believe, especially the members of the power structure, that they would be intelligent, reasonable, and comprising men. Nor did the group who caused the trouble represent a single faction. Two of these persons were professors, each with a different philosophy of education. A third one, who had been on the school board for some time, had a personal grudge against the superintendent which had to do with playing the organ at the church. The woman who was on the board had been the organist, but the superintendent's wife had taken over playing the organ at the time of his coming to the community. Although this was not admitted by the member of the board, several people in the community mentioned this as a factor in her dissatisfaction with the superintendent. The fourth member of the board was a businessman who ran a small store downtown and who was relatively independent of financial dependence on the banks.

These four persons had a caucus before the first board meeting, and decided to fire the superintendent. The grounds were that he was not carefully watching the school system itself, and was more interested in publication and in external visiblity than he was in the community.

At the first board meeting, the superintendent was taken completely by surprise when he was told that he should seek another job. At this time, his contract was not terminated but rather he was warned that it would be. This gave him the opportunity to resign voluntarily, since the members of the board who were against him were not anxious for a fight in the community.

At this point, the superintendent did not believe that the board either was sincere or could implement the statement they had made to him. Therefore, he did very little about seeking employment elsewhere. He also, strangely enough, did not consult with any intensity the powerful backers he had in the community.

At the second board meeting, he was asked if he had made a search of employment opportunities. When he said that he had not, the board told him that he had been fired. Apparently the vote was four to three, with the four members briefly described above voting to fire him. He was taken aback and was unprepared to retaliate at that moment.

After the firing, the superintendent called the vice president of one of the two biggest banks in town and the general manager of one of the industries which had national sales and is a well-known company. He told them he had been fired, and they were also surprised at the action. The superintendent had been a good servant, running a smooth school district, keeping the taxes low, and taking advantage of graduate student wives as teachers in the school system. The manager of the company mentioned earlier then called the president of the other of the two biggest banks in town, the newspaper editor who was higher in the power structure than is ordinarily the case, and a lawyer whose power came not from his practice of law but from the fact that he was a member of a wealthy and high prestige family of long standing in the community.

This group met and discussed the question of whether they wished to back the superintendent. The decision was to leave it up to the superintendent as to whether he wanted them to back him. They decided to have another meeting very soon at which time they would call the superintendent and talk to him. This first meeting, as well as the second meeting, was in the bank of the vice president whom the superintendent called first.

At the second meeting, the superintendent made his third mistake, the first being the approach of a political strategist when actually he was a servant of the power structure, and the second being his failure to contact the power structure immediately upon learning that he should seek employment elsewhere. This third mistake was the response given to the question presented him by the general manager of the plant, which was, "What do you want us to do?" The superintendent's response was an ultimatum. He asked that he be given a two-year contract and a raise in pay. The members of the power structure, who were accustomed to compromise, buying people off, and the like, did not like the response.

After some discussion, the power group meeting in the bank decided that they did not want to have open conflict because they took pride in their community. Probably hidden beneath this pride was a fear that they would be discovered. This fear was never expressed in this way, but they felt guilty about calling shots, as was consistent with findings in previous studies. Many of the members of this group were not quite ready to abandon the superintendent, however, and there were lengthy discussions through a period of two or three months as to what to do. Finally the decision to let the superintendent go in favor of avoiding conflict in the community was reached.

The method of operation was as follows:

1. The superintendent would be told that he should resign immediately. They would help him seek employment elsewhere at this time.

2. The most respected men in the group, as well as some of their business subordinates who had community stature, were asked to write letters to the newspaper commending the superintendent

after his resignation for a job very well done. These letters appeared in the paper in conspicuous spots on the editorial page, but play was not given to the letters on the front page except in connection with a story on the resignation. The story on the resignation, of course, included many laudatory facts about the career of the superintendent in that community, the stature of the school nationally, and other complimentary facts. These letters were concentrated in a period of about a week. The newspaper editor, of course, concurred and gave the best letters prominence and admitted no contradictory letters to the section on the letters to the editor.

3. The most respected member of the group in connection with the school was then asked to be chairman of the nominations committee for the school board for the coming year. This was satisfactory to the school board members. Since they were not aware of these meetings, they had apparently been given support or at least had been given no confrontation on the firing of the superintendent, and they also respected the person who had been asked to be chairman.

4. The person who was asked to be chairman of the nominating committee held the meeting at large in the gymnasium of the high school which had been named after him. The election was made of a committee to appoint candidates to run for the school board. This gave control through a majority to the power structure, since they had planted nominations of highly respected members of the community. This nominating board was elected, and since the election of a

nominating committee is usually not a controversial issue when people are not aware of conflict, the slate of candidates suggested by the power structure itself comprised a very large majority of the committee.

5. This committee then selected candidates after some difficulty. The candidates were exclusively persons who had previously been cooperative with the members of the power structure, and persons who neither by personality nor by business interest could afford to rock the boat. None of the members of the board who had voted to fire the superintendent ran again, and those whose terms had not expired were on the minority side as soon as the next election occurred.

The next superintendent was hired carefully in terms of experience in a middle-class community and particular ability to run a smooth operation in a setting in which conflict and confrontation were unheard of.

A closer watch was kept on the nominations of the school board members for the next election or two, but soon the power structure decided that things were running smoothly again, and they turned to the ways of the past in which they expected the board and superintendent to take care of their interests. The members of this group and their subordinates in their businesses helped the superintendent who had been fired to get a very good job in another community, and he did not lose money or prestige in the process.

The new superintendent maintained the low tax rates, continued the hiring policies, kept the same curriculum process, and held the line on other matters that could become issues arousing conflict between the various potential faction in the community. The new board members consulted the respected leadership in the community on crucial issues, but in the main their philosophy did not differ sufficiently from those respected leaders to warrant frequent consulting.

We find, then, that in the typical dominated community the school is a smooth running machine for the most part, and only when confrontation arises by accident do we ordinarily find the power structure coming into deliberate decision making with regard to the school. Furthermore, we find that the superintendent must play the role of the servant, consistent with the ideology and specific criteria favored by the power structure, if he is to be supported by that power structure. It was evident in the event described above that if the power structure had decided to support the superintendent, the members of the board who had voted to fire him would have changed their position immediately. So far as we could determine, none of them had sufficient grounds for maintaining a position against the pressure of the community from such respected sources.

At the time of the firing, there was much discussion in the community carried on at parties and across the fence and at coffee about the reasons for the firing, but there was practically no knowledge of the interplay between the bank vice president, the bank president, the editor, and the manager of the local industry or any of the other parties involved in the power structure in settling the issue without conflict. It is significant that there was no question in the minds of the top power figures as to whom to call to make the decision as to what should be done nor did they have any difficulty in implementing the policies with respect to avoiding conflict. There was a complete assessment of the structure of the community, and it was only the violation of the expectations which caused the members of the power structure to abandon the superintendent when they could have fairly easily kept him on the premises.

The fact that these persons neither brag about nor deny such events is probably a function of their security in their position. They look at this as protecting the basic mores of the society, in this case the local community which was dominated by the middle-class, and they do not see their actions violating the values of that class. They do feel guilty about the privacy of the operation, but this is simply consistent with the norms which they accept in their jobs all of the time.

In the dominated communities in which there is the smoothest operation of decision making, we found one of three situations. One condition under which the dominated community runs very smoothly is in the type of situation described in the case above, and in the study by Hunter, in which there may be a diversity of interests but the top level of the organizations agrees upon the need for cooperation on important issues. Importance of issues in this case is defined in terms of avoiding conflict, distraction, and confrontation.

Another possibility is the ideologically dominated community. In this case, the same philosophy with respect to the schools and other issues makes it unnecessary for the dominators to participate in most decisions. The ideology takes care of the decision-making process, standing as it does for the criteria in decision making. The third smoothly running situation is common in a one-industry town, in which the central core of the population involving the schools is employed either in a central industry or in other smaller occupations which are servicing the central industry. In this case, the power is reinforced not by an ideology but by the welfare of the board member and his occupational setting. In other words, the board member must make his decisions in the school setting in terms of advancement and security in his occupational life. It is only when there is a distracting mixture of roles or structures that it is necessary, under the three conditions named immediately above, for the power structure itself to come into play. Therefore, the test of domination must await the event in which it will be necessary for power to be exerted.

2. The Typical Factional Community

The factional community is characteristic of many of the large cities in the United States. We have selected as the classical case to be described briefly here a city of somewhat smaller size, slightly less than 100,000 in population. The large majority of the population are lower middle-class persons, located in relatively new ranch style houses. There are only a few upper middle-class professionals and businessmen in a special enclave. Because the community is new, and inasmuch as the school district does not correspond to other political lines, there is little opportunity for the expression of political ambition in community participation other than through the school offices. Therefore, the candidate for the school board often was announcing his availability for offices in the state legislature and other political arenas which in other communities might be found to be announced through candidacy for the mayor, the city council, or the prosecuting attorney.

The homogeneity of the class background of the population in this community would lead one to believe that it might be other than factional. However, there was a large Jewish and a large Catholic population in the community, and the liberal Jewish approach to education contrasted sharply with the conservative Catholic approach. This dispute often reached the national level, and we found that at one point the hundred teachers who were members of the teacher's labor union had signed a full-page advertisement in the biggest city paper in the area to the effect that they were looking for jobs elsewhere because of the conservative nature of the majority decisions which were being handed down.

This is not to say that there were not complex issues and problems that beset the schools in this district, because the very rapid growth of the population had caused an unusual amount of difficulty in tax assessments, in getting new buildings, and hiring new teachers.

Campaigns for school board membership in this district were unusually vitriolic. Posters were sent out about cleaning up the mess. The language used in these posters was neither vague nor ambiguous -- when someone was accused of telling a lie the word lie was used. Taxes were the main issue over which the campaigns were fought, but taxes often hid other issues of liberal education, the amount of money to be used in new buildings, the name of the school, and the like.

Because there was little opportunity for power to operate in the community in a dominated style, we discovered that people high in the power structure of each faction themselves ran for the school board. Such a case we do not believe to be typical, although it probably will not change the dynamics of factionalism very much.

Much of the campaign literature hinted at or plainly stated personal attacks on the integrity, the religious affiliation, and the like of the opposing candidate. There were accusations of vindictive and personal attack against the opposing candidate and unusually unflattering statements were commonplace. There were references to "mister nobody", mister spokesman, and the like. The religious identification between Jews and Catholics was very strong and very obvious. Furthermore, the questions of integrity, of consulting "other politically ambitious men in the community" and arbitrary judgments were found throughout the campaigning. There was also an accusation of the misuse of funds for personal use on expense accounts. The press in the local town used unusually provocative words in their headlines such as "blast", "heavy fire", "ignite fighting", and the like.